Published Papers:

The Determinable-Determinate Relation
(Nous, Sept. 2006)
Abstract:  Certain properties, such as color and red, stand in a special relation — they are related as determinable to determinate.  Many other properties are similarly related.  The determination relation is an interesting topic of logical investigation in its own right, and the prominent philosophical inquiries into this relation have, accordingly, operated at a high level of abstraction.   In this paper I offer an analysis of this relation.  This analysis yields payoffs in solving some basic metaphysical problems.  I first argue for a novel, two-featured analysis of the determination relation.  Then, this understanding is applied to yield insights into property instance (e.g., trope) individuation, how different property types can share an instance, the relation between property types and property instances, as well as applications to causation (mental causation, in particular).

A Liberal Conception of Multiple Realizability
(Philosophical Studies, Feb. 2007)
Abstract:  While the concept of multiple realizability is widely used, it is seldom rigorously characterized.  This paper defends a liberal conception of multiple realizability as sameness of type through any differences in the (lower-level) conditions that give rise to instances of that type.  This kind of “sameness through difference” is contrasted with another type of asymmetric dependency relation between properties, multiple specification.  This liberal conception is then defended from objections, and it is augmented by a concept of relativized multiple realizability.  This conception is contrasted with, and held to be superior to, alternative construals provided by Lawrence Shapiro and Jaegwon Kim, as well as those who deny the very possibility of multiply realized properties.  The last section presents a survey of the ontological, explanatory, and methodological consequences of this analysis of multiple realizability.

Multiple Realizability
(Philosophy Compass, Feb. 2007)
Abstract:  This article explains the concept of multiple realizability and its role in the philosophy of mind.  In particular, I consider what is required for the multiple realizability of psychological kinds, the relevance of multiple  realizability to the reducibility and autonomy of psychology, as well as further refinements of the concept that would prove helpful.

Three Varieties of Causal Overdetermination
(Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Dec. 2002)

Abstract:  Causal overdetermination worries arise in a number of domains, but most notably in the philosophy of mind.  In discussions of such worries, alleged examples of causal overdetermination are uniformly viewed as prima  facie problematic.  While all alleged cases of overdetermination might (ormight not) be problematic, I aim to show that they are so for different reasons.  Examples of causal overdetermination neatly divide into three varieties, corresponding to the connections between the mechanisms and the properties of the causes.  Future debates over overdetermination, and mental causation in particular, should pay heed to this distinction.

Imagination and Other Scripts (co-written with Shannon Spaulding)
(Philosophical Studies, forthcoming)
Abstract:  One version of the Humean Theory of Motivation holds that all actions can be causally explained by reference to a belief-desire pair.  Some have argued that pretense presents counter-examples to this principle, as pretense is instead causally explained by a belief-like imagining and a desire-like imagining.  We argue against this claim by denying imagination the power of motivation.  Still, we allow imagination a role in guiding action as a script.  We generalize the script concept to show how things besides imagination can occupy this same role in both pretense and non-pretense actions.  The Humean Theory of Motivation should then be modified to cover this script role.

Do the Self-Deceived Get What They Want?
(Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Sept. 2005)
Abstract:  Two of the most basic questions regarding self-deception remain unsettled:  What do self-deceivers want?  What do self-deceivers get?  I argue that self-deceivers are motivated by a desire to believe.  However, in significant contrast with Alfred Mele’s account of self-deception, I argue that self-deceivers do not satisfy this desire.  Instead, the end-state of self-deception is a false higher-order belief.  This shows all self-deception to be a failure of self-knowledge.

Willing Belief and the Norm of Truth
(Philosophical Studies, Aug. 2003)
Abstract:  Bernard Williams has argued that, because belief aims at getting the truth right, it is necessarily the case that we cannot directly will to believe.  Many others have adopted Williams’ claim that believers necessarily respect truth-conducive reasons and evidence.  By presenting increasingly stronger cases, I argue that believers can quite consciously disregard the norm of truth, and they can dismiss the demand for truth-conducive reasons and evidence.  The irrationality of those who would directly will to believe is not any greater than that displayed by some actual believers.  So, our inability to directly will to believe is a contingent truth (at best).

Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination
(Canadian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming)
Abstract:  In traditional Frankfurt cases some conditions that make an outcome unavoidable fail to bring about that outcome.  These are cases of causal preemption. I defend this interpretation of traditional Frankfurt cases, and its application to free will, against a dilemma raised by various libertarians. But I go on to argue that Frankfurt cases involving genuine (symmetric) causal overdetermination are even more effective at achieving the compatibilist's purposes.  Such cases avoid the “flicker of freedom” debate and better display the central disagreement with regard to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.

Self-Deception and the Limits of Folk Psychology
(Social Theory and Practice, forthcoming)
Abstract:  This article considers the product of self-deception.  Many assume, or argue, that the product of self-deception is a belief.  I argue against this being a general truth by outlining some of the ways in which the self-deceived can be deeply conflicted, such that there is no fact of the matter concerning what they believe.  These situations are not adequately addressed by many accounts of self-deception.  Further, I argue that this task requires going beyond our folk psychological classifications.

Regarding-as-True Stances
Abstract:  To believe a proposition is to regard it as true.  But there are various ways in which one can regard a proposition as true.  In this paper I detail sixteen such regarding-as-true stances.  I then consider how belief relates to these various stances.  I argue that various problems concerning belief attribution — such as cases of self-deception, hypocrisy, delusions, and irrational emotional responses — could be solved by replacing belief-talk with this finer grained regarding-as-true talk.

Some paper on the Humean Theory of Motivation

On Privileging God's Moral Goodness
(Faith and Philosophy, Oct. 2006)
Abstract:  Prima facie, there is an incompatibility between God’s alleged omnipotence and impeccability.  I argue that this incompatibility is more than prima facie.  Attempts to avoid this appearance of incompatibility by allowing that there are commonplace states of affairs that an omnipotent being  cannot bring about are unsuccessful.  Instead, we should accept that God is not omnipotent.  This is acceptable since it is a mistake to hold that omnipotence is a perfection.  God’s moral perfection should be privileged over God’s potency properties — and the same is true of human beings as well.