Topic:  LePore and Loewer’s “Mind Matters”

*They begin by presenting one of the mind-body problems in the form of claims 1-3.  These claims raise the familiar problem of how Cartesian-style interactionism can occur, given that the physical is causally closed.  Claims 4-6, the premises of Davidson’s AM, are modern, physicalist variations of claims 1-3, but 4-6 are supposed to be compatible.  Remember, Davidson claimed that token identity shows how claims 4-6 are compatible.

    --For Davidson, and many other non-reductionists, the “distinctness” of the mental and physical is only at the type level:
    “The mental and physical are distinct insofar as they are not linked by strict law—mental properties are not reducible to
    physical properties—but they are not distinct insofar as mental events are physical events.” (p. 632)

    --The familiar “in virtue of” objection against AM is discussed on pp. 633-634.

*LePore and Loewer argue that the “in virtue of” objection is incorrect, and that it does not establish the epiphenomenalism (i.e., causal irrelevance) of the mental.

*LePore and Loewer will offer a general account of causal relevance.  In fact, they distinguish between two senses of causal relevance:

    “a)  Properties F and G are relevant1 to making it the case that c causes e, and
    b)  c’s possessing property F is causally relevant2 to e’s possessing property G.

    We will say that (a) holds iff c has F and e has G, and there is a strict law that entails Fs cause Gs.  It is in this sense that it is
    c’s having F and e’s having G “make it the case” that c causes e.  Relevance2 is a relation among c, one of its properties F,
    e, and one of its properties G.  It holds when c’s being F brings it about that e is G.  We shall argue that those who charge
    AM with epiphenomenalism are guilty of confusing relevance1 with relevance2.” (pp. 634-635)

    --Though the critics of AM are not explicit about this, they seem to be assuming a counterfactual test for causal relevance,
    claim LePore and Loewer.  LePore and Loewer provide a formal characterization of this sense of causal relevance on p.
    635.  They then argue that even assuming the truth of AM, mental properties can pass this test.

        --LePore and Loewer accept the Lewis-Stalnaker account of evaluating counterfactuals.
        “A>B is true iff B is true at all the worlds most similar to the actual world at which A is true (or A is true at no such
        world).” (p. 636)

        --This account requires a similarity order for possible worlds.

        --A B-type event can counterfactually depend on an A-type event, without there being a strict law connecting A-types to
        B-types.

*After having argued for the compatibility of causal relevance2 and the denial of causal relevance1, they go on to consider to problems:

    1) Is causal irrelevance1 sufficient for epiphenomenalism?

    Their answer:  Only according to overly strict principles for causal relevance like those advocated by Honderich, as
    discussed on pp. 637-638.

    2) Is the mental causally irrelevant2 on AM, after all? (p. 637)

    --Consider the proposal for causal irrelevance2 that LePore and Loewer extract from Sosa:
    “c’s being F is causally irrelevant2 to e’s being G, if there is a property F* of c such that (F*c & -Fc) > Ge holds
    nonvacuously. (p. 638)
 
         --In such a case, F*c might “screen off” Fc from Ge.

        Q:  Do neural properties screen off intentional mental properties?

        Their answer:  Maybe.  But the Sosa standard for causal relevance2 is incorrect.  Even properties that are connected to
        an effect by a strict law are causally irrelevant2!  (Examples are given on pp. 639-640.)
 
        Response:  Why not think that lawfully connected properties might nevertheless fail to be causally relevant??