Topic:  Dretske’s Explaining Behavior, Chapters 5 and 6

[For Chapter 4, see Aleks’ handout.]

Chapter 5:  Motivation and Desire

*Beliefs alone do not explain behavior—agents must also possess some kind of motivational state.  Chapter 4 accounted for the role of belief in explaining behavior, and Chapter 5 now has the task of accounting for this motivational/desire aspect.

*On p. 111 Dretske distinguishes between pure and derived desires.  As I understand it, a pure desire is a desire for something as an end in itself.  A derived desire is a desire for something as a means to some further desire.

Goal-directed behavior:  “goal-directed behavior is not only behavior that tends to have a certain result but behavior that occurs because it tends to have this result.” (p. 111)  [Dretske qualifies this by noting that this is only a sufficient condition for goal-directed behavior.]

*Dretske repeats the same “recruitment”-talk that he introduced when accounting for indicators as reason-causes in Chapter 4:

    “We have just seen that if D is an internal state on which the reinforcing character of R depends, then behavior that is
    reinforced by R will be behavior in which D is recruited as an internal cause of whatever movements the behavior requires.  D
    becomes a cause of M because M results in R.  Given our earlier description of goal-directed behavior, though, this implies
    that M’s production by D and B is goal-directed, that the behavior has R as its goal.  It implies, in other words, that such
    behavior can be explained by facts about B and D—the facts, namely that B indicates or means that condition F exists (that is
    why it was recruited as a partial cause of M) and the fact that D is for R (that is why it was enlisted as a partial cause of M).
    The animal behaves that way because it believes that F exists and wants R.” (p. 113)

*Examine the last paragraph on p. 114 to see the relevance of the distinction between triggering and structuring causes with respect to desire.

*The distinction between explicit and implicit belief (or, more generally, representations) is discussed on pp. 117-119.  This distinction is used to characterize goal-intended behavior:

Goal-intended behavior:  Goal-directed behavior with fully explicit cognitive representations. (p. 120)

    --More sophisticated behavior, like that of human beings, is goal-intended.  Much other animal behavior, in contrast, may merely
    be goal-directed.

    --Dretske terms the motivational state behind tropistic behavior (e.g., reflexes and fixed action patterns) drives.  Drives are not
    for some goal, though they are directed toward some goal.  So, drives aren’t even involved in (mere) goal-directed behavior.
    (p. 124)

    “Behavior that is not the result of learning, whether it be the rigidly programmed behavior of regulative bodily subsystems or
    the instinctive behavior of the animal itself, is not goal-directed behavior.  Whatever drive or motive, d, we suppose is operating
    inside the animal to produce the movements resulting in R does not qualify as a desire for the condition it drives the animal
    toward.  This internal state, though it drives the animal toward R, does not have R as its goal, because reaching this goal does
    not explain why the animal is driven toward it.” (p. 126)

*Dretske then explains the intentionality of desires (summarized by 4 points on p. 130), and that the object of a desire is that which reinforced the behavior that lead to satisfying the desire in the past of the individual animal (e.g., pp. 128-129).

*The last section notes the multiple realizability of behavior.  In this section Dretske states that reasons explanations do not purport to explain the manner of behavior, but simply the direction of behavior (e.g., why the behavior was for a certain end-product/result).  Dretske claims that behavior should be individuated with respect to its end-product/result, not by the manner in which it is performed (e.g., consider the experiments discussed on p. 135).

Chapter 6:  The Interactive Nature of Reasons

*Chapter 6 concerns the complications that emerge when we consider our derived desires.  These are the desires that emerge after considering the best (or at least very good) means to satisfy our basic, pure desires.  We might have these derived desires, though no rewards or punishments from the past have reinforced behavior leading to the satisfaction of these desires.

    --We may use new means to reach a desired end.  The desire doesn’t explain the means used, but it does explain why a certain
    end-product is sought--e.g., not why the rat is swimming to the goal box, but why it is swimming to the goal box. (p. 143)

    --Dretske stresses that learning can occur without reinforcement.  This knowledge can then be utilized in novel situations, when
    a new means to a desired end is required. (pp. 144-145)

    --According to Dretske, one cannot have a pure desire for something (i.e., find something intrinsically desirable) unless one has
    already experienced the satisfaction of that desire. (p. 148)  One can have new desires (i.e., a desire for something that one has
    never satisfied) only in a derived sense (e.g., that is, as an expected means of satisfying some other desire).

    --Dretske concludes by explaining how his view explains the holism of the mental. (pp. 150-151)  He also distinguishes concepts
    from discriminatory capacities. (p. 154)