

IMAGINATION AND OTHER SCRIPTS

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ABSTRACT. One version of the Humean Theory of Motivation holds that all actions can be causally explained by reference to a belief-desire pair. Some have argued that pretense presents counter-examples to this principle, as pretense is instead causally explained by a belief-like imagining and a desire-like imagining. We argue against this claim by denying imagination the power of motivation. Still, we allow imagination a role in *guiding* action as a *script*. We generalize the script concept to show how things besides imagination can occupy this same role in both pretense and non-pretense actions. The Humean Theory of Motivation should then be modified to cover this script role.

“Often, imagination isn’t everything it’s cracked up to be. . . imagination without energy remains inert.”

Richard Russo, *Straight Man*

1. INTRODUCTION

The last two decades has seen an explosion of philosophical interest in the subject of imagination — in particular its connections to pretense, “mindreading”, and the arts.¹ For present purposes, we are interested in the connections between imagination and pretense actions.² Pretense, such as a child speaking into a banana as if it were a phone, stands in need of special explanation as straightforward belief-desire explanations seem to miss the mark. The child does not really believe that the banana is a phone and desire to make a phone call, though these are the mental states that would typically explain the action that the child is pretending. Of course, the child *is* only pretending.

Some have argued that the correct explanation is that such pretenders are motivated to act not in the customary belief-desire manner,

¹The literature here is huge, but the following is a sampling of some of the significant, and more recent, works in these areas: Harris (2000), Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), Nichols and Stich (2003), Walton (1990), and Lopes and Kieran (2003).

²On our usage, ‘pretense’ refers to certain behaviors — typically bodily movements — that, we later argue, rise to the level of action. Imagination is a purely mental activity, either individual or collective, that accompanies much pretense.

but by their analogues in imagination.³ The child has the belief-like imagining that the banana is a phone and the desire-like imagining to make a phone call, and these states of imagination play the motivational role usually reserved for genuine beliefs and desires. Pretense would then provide a noteworthy exception to traditional, broadly Humean, accounts of motivation. (One would then expect there to be other kinds of exceptions as well.) Our primary goal in what follows is to defend this Humean tradition on motivation against these imagination-focused alternatives, but with some long overdue recommendations for modifying the Humean picture.

But what, exactly, is the Humean tradition of psychological motivation? Various claims fall under the heading *Humean Theory of Motivation* (HTM), but for our purposes we are interested in two such versions of the HTM. First, there is the *Belief-Desire Thesis*.

Belief-Desire Thesis: For every intentional action there is a belief-desire pair that both causes and rationalizes that intentional action.⁴

This is the thesis in its narrow form. We can also generate theses that are more general in their characterization of the relevant mental states, though similar in spirit, by substituting ‘pro-attitude’, ‘want’, or names for other motivational states for ‘desire’ (and likewise for belief). But the spirit of the thesis is clear. It can be traced back to Hume’s talk of the passions and reason, with the former providing the impulse, energy, or simply the motivation for action, and the latter playing a guiding or directive role.

A different version of the HTM, and one more closely associated with Hume himself, is the *Motivation-as-Desire Thesis*.

Motivation-as-Desire Thesis: Desire, and only desire, is the motivation behind every action.

The second thesis makes explicit the motivational role of desire, and its exclusive claim to this title.⁵ This thesis privileges desire by holding that the ends or goals to which action aims can be established only by

³Currie (2002), Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), and Velleman (2000).

⁴A few clarifications: First, as is the case with causal accounts of other fundamental concepts, this causation must be “non-deviant” or “in the right sort of way”. Second, in subsequent uses of ‘action’ we drop the qualification ‘intentional’. ‘Action’ is to be understood as something of a philosopher’s term of art. We take actions to be the kinds of things that have explanations in both the causal and rationalization senses. Compare with Davidson (1963/2002).

⁵Arguments for the Motivation-as-Desire Thesis are made by Hume (1978), Book II, Part III, Section III; Smith (1987); Smith (1994), Chapter 4; and Mele (1989). As with much of action theory this thesis also traces back to Aristotle, who claimed

desire. These ends or goals cannot be generated by reason or belief, nor can they be evaluated by reason (say, for truth or falsity). Instead, reason and belief are relegated to the secondary role of finding the best, or at least satisficing, means to accomplish the projects set by desire. This is a familiar Humean tale.

Talk of motivation and reasons for action is complicated and often confused, with these words used in different senses by different theorists. We will use ‘motivation’ to refer to a psychologically real disposition or inclination toward a certain end. Consistent with this use of ‘motivation’, one can have a reason for action in the externalist’s sense that in no way motivates the agent for whom it is a reason. Importantly, one could even *accept* that one has a good reason for action without that acceptance providing any motivation in our sense.⁶

It should be clear what would count as counter-examples to these versions of the HTM. A case that passes our intuitive test for an action or possesses the theoretically and/or empirically discovered marks of action, but yet is not caused (or rationalized) by a belief-desire pair, would be a counter-example to the Belief-Desire Thesis. And a case in which something sufficiently unlike a desire (say, a belief) establishes the goal or end of action, would be a counter-example to the Motivation-as-Desire Thesis. Some have argued that pretense provides counter-examples to each version of the HTM. In section 2 we consider the prominent arguments against Humean accounts of pretense, and in favor of the Imagination-as-Motivation alternative. We respond to these arguments in section 3, defending the two HTM theses as applied to pretense actions, though we also make modifications that the application to pretense recommends. Finally, we offer our positive account of imagination, pretense, and its motivation in section 4.⁷

that, “Intellect itself, however, moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical.” *NE*, Book VI (W.D. Ross translation).

⁶Stocker (1979) offers examples of this type: “Through spiritual or physical tiredness, through accidie, through weakness of body, through illness, through general apathy, through despair, through inability to concentrate, through a feeling of uselessness or futility, and so on, one may feel less and less motivated to seek what is good. . . More generally, something can be good and one can believe it to be good without being in a mood or having an interest or energy structure which inclines one to seek or even desire it.” (744, 745).

⁷The most prominent and detailed defense of a Humean account of pretense is provided by Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich (2003). Their main accomplishment, with regard to pretense, is the development of a cognitive architecture for imagination and pretense. Our aim is slightly different. While the work of Nichols and Stich is highly commendable for its contributions to uncovering the cognitive structures of the pretending mind, we feel that their account of the motivation for pretense

2. IMAGINATION-AS-MOTIVATION

Let's begin with a concrete example. As they stroll through the woods Stacey, Kelcey, and Cassi encounter a cluster of oak trees. Kelcey points into the woods and asks his sister, "Stacey, do you want to see what's on sale in there?" She eagerly says yes, and together they run into the woods to look around. "How does this skirt look on me?" Stacey asks, picking up a branch and holding it next to her. "Pink is your color. You should definitely buy it," Kelcey replies. Stacey agrees and says that she will buy it. "Oh Manager! Manager, where are you?!", Stacey and Kelcey shout. On cue, Cassi walks out from behind a tree, gestures at the branch Stacey is holding and says, "Would you like to purchase that lovely pink skirt today? Okay, that comes to \$700,000. Will you pay with cash or credit card?" "Cash," Stacey answers, handing over two handfuls of rocks. "Keep the change."

Stacey, Kelcey, and Cassi are pretending that they are in a shopping mall. They are pretending that the branch is a pink skirt, that Cassi is a store manager and that rocks are money. But how, if at all, is such action covered by the Belief-Desire and Desire-as-Motivation Theses?

2.1. The negative case: Currie, Ravenscroft, and Velleman against Humean accounts of pretense. A narrow Humean account of pretense, we shall stipulate, is one which claims that pretense satisfies the constraints imposed by the Belief-Desire and Desire-as-Motivation Theses. So, a narrow Humean account of pretense holds that there are belief-desire pairs underlying pretense and that the motivation for pretense is fundamentally supplied by desire. It would be a mistake to think there is only one Humean account of pretense, as Humeans can certainly disagree over the content of the operative beliefs and desires. Nevertheless, there is some consensus, by both Humeans and Anti-Humeans, that the Humean will advance the following desire: The pretender desires to pretend in accordance with what she imagines, or she desires to behave as if she were a certain type of thing or in some particular situation. As Nichols and Stich (2003) claim, "the pretender engages in the pretense action because she wants to behave in a way similar to the way some person or object would behave in a possible world scenario [that she imagines]."⁸ For example, Stacey's pretense

(i.e., why pretenders *do* anything in the first place) stands in need of further development. We aim to do this by applying broader action-theoretic considerations to the special case of pretense.

⁸Nichols and Stich (2003), p. 38. The view that the pretender desires to act in accordance with what she imagines is also attributed to the Humean by Velleman (2000), p. 256 and Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), pp. 120–121.

is explained by her desire to act out her imaginings that a wooded area is a shopping mall, a branch is a pink skirt, rocks are money, etc. in order, perhaps, to experience them more vividly and realistically. This narrow Humean account of the operative desire in pretense suggests the following role for belief: The pretender believes that such-and-such behavior is the way to pretend in accordance with what she imagines, or is how someone/thing would behave in the pretend situation.

Gregory Currie, Ian Ravenscroft, and David Velleman offer the following objections to such Humean accounts of pretense. Let's consider these objections with some care, as we will reply to each objection, as well as their positive case, in section 3.

2.1.1. *The Humean account requires inappropriate attributions of pretense concepts to children.* Currie and Ravenscroft argue that the Humean is committed to crediting young children with implausible conceptual sophistication.⁹ They claim that narrow Humean accounts credit the pretender with at least some minimal concept of pretense, whereas their Imagination-as-Motivation alternative, according to which pretense is motivated by imagination, does not. If the Humean account were correct, they argue, then the pretense would be motivated by beliefs and desires *about pretending*. In so far as we attribute beliefs and desires about pretense, we attribute understanding of the concept of pretense to pretenders. And, according to them, crediting children with this conceptual knowledge is a strike against the narrow Humean account.

Velleman also argues that a belief-desire explanation of pretense credits child pretenders with a “precocious mastery of the distinction between fact and fiction.”¹⁰ He claims that a belief-desire explanation construes pretending as the intentional production of false appearances. Velleman interprets the desire to pretend as a desire to fabricate a fictitious set of circumstances. But if we credit the child with a desire to fabricate a fictitious set of circumstances, then we are crediting the child with conceptual knowledge of fact and fiction and an understanding of the distinction between the two. Such knowledge typically is not attributed to 2 year-olds, despite their ability to pretend. For example, beginning with Wimmer and Perner (1983) it has been demonstrated that 2 year-olds cannot yet pass the false-belief tests. And fiction, like false belief, is an attitude that runs contrary to the facts of the world. Moreover, Velleman argues, if pretending is indeed the intentional production of false appearances, then we would expect adults to

⁹Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), p. 127. See also Currie (2002), pp. 213–214.

¹⁰Velleman (2000), p. 257.

be better at pretending than children, since adults have a better grasp of the distinction between fact and fiction. But adults are *worse* than children at pretending. For this reason Velleman denies that pretending is the intentional production of false appearances, as the narrow Humean account would have it. Instead, pretending is acting out of one's imagination, an activity that adults have inhibitions against.

2.1.2. *The Humean account leaves the pretending child outside the pretense.* Velleman also argues that if a child's pretense were causally motivated by beliefs and desires about the fiction, then the child would never really enter into the fiction. The child would remain outside the fiction because she would be motivated by a desire to pretend, or to deliberately produce false appearances, and would consequently view the fiction as something to act *out* rather than to act *out of*.¹¹ Velleman's claim is that the child can be said to enter into the imaginary world only if the child acts *out of* her imagining, that is, only if she is motivated from within the point-of-view that she is imagining. Thus, only if Stacey is motivated by her "beliefs" and "desires" within the fiction, is she acting *out of* the perspective of the character she is pretending to be (and not merely out of a desire to behaviorally represent it) and *really* entering into the fiction. Since the Humean denies that the pretender is motivated by the attitudes within the fiction, the Humean leaves the child outside the pretense, merely acting out her imaginings.

2.1.3. *The Humean account denies the creativity of children's pretense.* If a belief-desire account of pretending were correct, Velleman claims, then a child who pretends to be an elephant would be motivated by his desire to act like an elephant and would act according to his beliefs about how elephants behave. But, Velleman stresses, children are capable and proficient at inventing and understanding a wide array of new ways of pretending. Particularly imaginative children come up with unique ways of pretending that are very dissimilar to their beliefs about the world. For instance, a child might come up with a way of pretending to be an elephant that differs from or even contradicts his beliefs about how elephants actually behave. Since the child's elephant pretense does not correspond with what the child believes about elephants' actual behavior, this feature of pretending is mysterious, or even inappropriate, on the belief-desire explanation. Similarly, Cassi's behavior while pretending to be a clothing store manager does not correspond with what she believes about how clothing store managers

¹¹Velleman (2000), p. 257.

actually behave — e.g., Cassi does not believe that clothing store managers charge \$700,000 for a skirt.

Contrary to his depiction of the Humean, Velleman claims that successful pretense requires the pretender to imagine *being* the character, not merely acting *like* the character. The desire to act *like* some person or thing cannot account for novel or creative pretense.

2.1.4. *The Humean account does not fully explain our attitudes toward imagined or fictional characters and situations.* According to the Humean genuine beliefs and desires motivate our pretense — e.g., Stacey, Kelcey, and Cassi have genuine desires to pretend as if they are shopping in the mall. In other words, they desire to act out a particular narrative provided by their imaginations. But not all of the reactions that pretenders have within the pretense, in particular the emotional reactions, make sense on the supposition that only genuine desires are present. Currie and Ravenscroft make a distinction, common in the literature on emotional reactions to fiction, between our attitudes toward the fictional narrative and our attitudes toward the characters and scenes in the fiction. As an appreciator of good drama, we desire that Desdemona be killed. But our attitude toward the fictional character is quite different — we do not desire, of the fictional character Desdemona, that she be killed.¹²

While Currie and Ravenscroft do not explicitly apply this point to children's pretense, we believe they are gesturing toward the following objection. Sometimes children engage in behaviors and have emotional reactions within a pretense that are not adequately explained by supposing that the children desire to have this narrative unfold. A child, much like a theatergoer, might experience sadness (or its pretense counterpart) when pretending that its imaginary pet has been injured. This sadness, Currie and Ravenscroft seem to be suggesting, cannot be fully explained by making reference to genuine desires. If the child genuinely desires to pretend that his imaginary pet iguana has a painful sunburn, then why would this child also cry and grow sad over this outcome? Genuine desires regarding the pretense cannot explain this reaction any more than the genuine desire for dramatic excellence can explain our tears when Desdemona is killed. This seems to suggest, to them, that something besides a genuine desire is motivating the pretenders.

2.2. The positive case.

¹²Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), pp. 20–21.

2.2.1. *Impractical reasoning.* In light of these criticisms, Currie and Ravenscroft offer an alternative to Humean explanations of pretense. On their account the general structure of Humean psychological explanation is preserved, but rather than genuine beliefs and desires motivating pretense it sometimes happens that their analogues in imagination play this motivational role. Let us consider both their case for the existence of such belief-like and desire-like imaginings, as well as their argument for the conclusion that such states sometimes motivate pretense.

First, they reason that since in imagination we believe and desire things that we do not actually believe and desire, there must be imaginative substitutes for beliefs and desires.¹³ For instance, Stacey is pretending to be shopping with Kelcey and Cassi. *In the fiction* she believes that Kelcey is her shopping partner and Cassi is the store manager, and *in the fiction* she desires to purchase an expensive pink skirt. But in reality Stacey does not believe that Kelcey is shopping with her or that Cassi is a store manager. In reality Stacey does not desire to purchase a \$700,000 pink skirt. What she believes and desires in imagination runs counter to what she believes and desires in reality. Currie and Ravenscroft argue that to avoid attributing contradictory beliefs and conflicting desires in such a case, we must posit belief-like and desire-like imaginings.

They characterize belief-like and desire-like imaginings as states that are not beliefs or desires, but mimic the functioning of real beliefs and desires with respect to inferential reasoning and motivation for (pretense) action.¹⁴ For example, Stacey's belief-like imagining that she is in a clothing store leads to the belief-like imagining that there are clothes in this store that she might desire to purchase, in the same way that if she were actually in a clothing store she would believe that there are clothes in the store that she might desire to purchase. Beliefs in imagination inferentially lead to new beliefs in imagination just like real beliefs inferentially lead to new real beliefs. This is called *productive pretending*.¹⁵ Because belief-like imaginings are not real beliefs, the pretender does not possess contradictory beliefs — e.g., that this branch both is and is not a pink skirt. And just as belief-like imaginings mimic the inferential functioning of real beliefs, desire-like imaginings, they hypothesize, mimic the motivational powers of real desires.

¹³Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), p. 8.

¹⁴Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), p. 11.

¹⁵Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), p. 125.

Given the supposed capacity of belief-like and desire-like imaginings to function like real beliefs and desires in practical reasoning, Currie and Ravenscroft call the imagination-driven process that results in pretense *impractical reasoning*. On their view some, but not all, pretense is the result of impractical reasoning. (Some pretense does not involve imagination at all.) This theory of pretense is supposed to explain the phenomena while avoiding the objections plaguing the Humean. In particular, it does not require that the pretender possess a desire to pretend and, therefore, the concept of pretense. And the existence of desire-like imaginings is supposed to explain her attitudes and reactions towards fictional characters and scenes.

2.2.2. *The Velleman account.* Velleman (2000) offers another alternative to the Humean account. Like Currie and Ravenscroft, Velleman argues for an explanation of imagining that involves imaginative substitutes for beliefs and desires — mock-beliefs and mock-desires. These mock-beliefs and mock-desires also function like beliefs and desires, but are not actual beliefs and desires. Whereas Currie and Ravenscroft hold that pretense can *sometimes* be motivated by belief-like and desire-like imaginings, Velleman holds that imagination, via mock-beliefs and mock-desires, has motivational powers equivalent to beliefs and desires, and that all pretense (make-believe) is so motivated.¹⁶ In this sense, Velleman argues for a stronger claim than do Currie and Ravenscroft.

Recall two of Velleman's main objections to a Humean account of pretense: It leaves the child securely outside the fiction and denies the creativity of children's pretense. Velleman emphasizes that an explanation of pretense that admits the agent into the fictional world must have the agent acting *out of* (as opposed to acting *out*) her imaginings. In order for an agent to act out of her imaginings, she must be motivated from within the point-of-view of the thing or character she imagines. And he claims that only if one is motivated by the imagination can one be motivated from within the point-of-view of the thing or character imagined, and only then can the agent be said to enter into the fiction.¹⁷ Thus, Velleman's explanation of Cassi's pretense would be something like the following: Cassi imagines being the manager of a clothing store and, from within the point-of-view of the clothing store manager, her actions are motivated by mock-beliefs and mock-desires. In this way the explanation admits Cassi into her fictional world and allows her motivational and emotional attitudes towards things in that world.

¹⁶Velleman (2000), p. 272, and Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), pp. 116–119.

¹⁷Velleman (2000), p. 259.

In addition to admitting the pretender into her fictional world, Velleman's account elucidates the creativity of children's pretense without requiring the agent to have any conceptual knowledge of pretense. When Cassi imagines herself to be the clothing store manager, she is moved by her imaginings as this character. Cassi can have all sorts of mock-beliefs and mock-desires in the role of clothing store manager. These mock-beliefs and mock-desires can be appropriate to the role Cassi takes on, or not. Since on Velleman's account it is these imaginings from within the point-of-view of the clothing store manager that motivate Cassi's behavior, and not a desire to pretend to be a clothing store manager, the pretense behavior is innovative and widely diverges from Cassi's actual beliefs about clothing store managers. In this way, Velleman preserves children's creativity in pretense and avoids attributing to the pretender any conceptual knowledge of pretense, or the subject matter they are pretending for that matter.

It should be clear that both the Currie and Ravenscroft and the Velleman accounts deny the two HTM theses from Section 1.

3. AGAINST IMAGINATION-AS-MOTIVATION

In this section we both respond to the pretense-focused attacks on the HTM, as well as offer our own criticisms of the Imagination-as-Motivation alternative.

3.1. The Belief-Desire and Desire-as-Motivation Theses have records of success that warrant presumption in their favor. Suppose you think that the Belief-Desire and Desire-as-Motivation Theses handle all other kinds of actions, but you are unsure if they handle pretense. *If* it is a fact that these theses have widespread success with regard to other kinds of actions, that in itself should put presumption in their favor when it comes to pretense. We take this to be a relatively weak, yet still legitimate, point in favor of Humean accounts of pretense. It would simply be odd if imagination were an exception to these theses, unless there are several other types of exceptions as well. (Of course, finding other exceptions decreases this presumption.) Burden of proof moves are unsavory, so let us look for stronger reasons.

3.2. The plausibility of the Imagination-as-Motivation Thesis depends on competing against an uncharitably weak Humean account. The Imagination-as-Motivation Thesis begins with the supposed failure of the Humean account to accurately capture the nature

of pretense. In this subsection we respond to the four section 2.1 arguments against the Humean account.

3.2.1. *The Humean need not attribute pretense concepts to pretenders.* Currie, Ravenscroft, and Velleman make the familiar argument that a belief-desire explanation of pretense implausibly requires that children pretenders possess the concept of pretense. On narrow Humean accounts of pretense, the child desires to behave in a certain way that accords with her imaginings and believes that certain behaviors are good ways to satisfy this desire. But how cognitively rich and sophisticated is the content of this desire?

Following Nichols and Stich (2003), we believe that the Humean is committed, at most, to children possessing a behavioral, as opposed to a mentalistic, understanding of pretense. Children have a behavioral understanding of pretense in that their desire to pretend that p is simply a desire to behave, loosely, as if p were the case. And their beliefs about pretending are simply beliefs about what counts as behaving as if p . A mentalistic understanding of pretense, on the other hand, is one that recognizes pretense as produced by underlying mental states of a certain kind. We deny that children who pretend must possess a mentalistic understanding of pretense. Instead, we hold that the child's desire to pretend is simply a desire to behave in a certain way, and the child's beliefs about pretending, therefore, are simply beliefs about what sort of behavior would satisfy his desire.¹⁸ That the child has a desire to behave in a way that is in fact pretending does not entail that the child has conceptual knowledge of pretense. In the same way, if a child desires to behave in a way that conveys his love for his parents, perhaps by giving them hugs and kisses, this child need not understand the concept of love. Again, the Humean is only committed to the child possessing a motivation to act in a way that as a matter of fact counts as pretense. The child need not recognize that action as pretense, however.

Empirical evidence supports our claim that children have a behavioral understanding of pretense. For example, Rebekah Richert and Angeline Lillard present evidence that by age three children can successfully distinguish pretense actions from real actions at a level better than chance on the basis of behavioral cues.¹⁹ In their experiments,

¹⁸Technically, then, the child does not necessarily have a desire to pretend as such, or under that description. Instead, the desire is better characterized as a desire to behave as if p (all the while knowing that not- p). Future occurrences of "a desire to pretend" should be read with this clarification in mind.

¹⁹Richert and Lillard (2004).

pre-school to elementary age children were shown video clips of pretense and non-pretense actions and asked to identify the actions in each clip as pretend or not pretend. The children recognized that the behavior presented to them was “as if” behavior by various behavioral cues, such as looking patterns and mis-timed behaviors.

Given the children’s ability to identify pretense by behavioral cues and our supposition that children’s beliefs and desires about pretense are simply beliefs and desires about behaving in a certain way, it is not surprising that empirical evidence reveals that children under the age of four fail to distinguish pretense from behavior motivated by false belief. One such study observes that young children often confuse actions guided by false belief with pretense by persistently describing a character as pretending to feed a rabbit in a hutch despite being told that the character falsely believes that there is a rabbit in the hutch.²⁰ Another study describes young children attributing pretense to inanimate objects such as airplanes.²¹ These studies clearly demonstrate that young children are sometimes confused about the mentalistic nature of pretense, thereby advancing our claim that young children need not have a mentalistic understanding of pretense.²²

3.2.2. *The Humean can place the pretender fully in the imaginary world.* Velleman objects that a Humean account portrays the pretender as securely outside the fictional world, merely acting *out* the fiction rather than acting *out of* the fiction. He reasons that postulating an intermediary desire to pretend puts a barrier between the pretender and the fictional world. The desire to pretend objectifies the fiction as something to be enacted, thereby prohibiting the pretender from entering into the fictional world.

The first thing to be said about this objection is that Velleman is simply begging the question against the Humean. Velleman claims that a child enters an imaginary world only if that child is motivated by imagination. To the extent that pretense involves “entering” an imaginary world, of course the Humean will deny this claim. As it is, Velleman is simply asserting that entering an imaginary world requires motivation by imagination and the Humean denies this.

²⁰See Perner, Baker et. al. (1994).

²¹See Lillard, Zeljo et. al. (2000).

²²Alan Leslie (1987) argues, to the contrary, that young children pretenders do possess a concept of pretense. He states, “Pretending oneself is thus a special case of the ability to understand pretense in others. . . In short, pretense is an early manifestation of what has been called *theory of mind*.” (416) Though this position is compatible with a Humean account of pretending, we do not think it is supported by the empirical evidence.

But while we deny that imagination motivates pretense, we do not deny imagination a role in the production of pretense. In fact, as we describe in Section 4 below, imagination often plays an important role in guiding pretense. For those kinds of pretense that are intimately connected to imagination, imagination serves as a script for the pretense while desire serves as the motivator. With this picture, the pretender can be as entrenched in her imaginary world as her motivating states, imagination, and power of will allow her. The pretender, motivated by beliefs and desires, need not consciously consult her desire to pretend in order to engage in pretense. The pretender very possibly will not even be cognizant of such a desire.²³ Thus, it seems clear that the pretender can be motivated by the desire to pretend, or some other real-world motivating state, and guided by his imaginings in a seamless process that admits him fully into the fictional world. Furthermore, in order to distinguish children's pretense from, say, the delusional actions of a schizophrenic who mistakes his imaginings for reality, we have good reason to attribute some real-world motivational state to the child. It is not depressing, but rather comforting, that pretending children retain a relatively firm grip on reality. In fact, the very concept of pretense requires this.

3.2.3. *The Humean can preserve the characteristic creativity of pretenders.* Velleman claims that on the Humean picture children who pretend have a desire to act like a certain character and then generate their pretense by consulting their beliefs about how such a character acts. This Humean account, Velleman claims, denies the child the creativity that is the hallmark of pretense. Therefore, this Humean account is incorrect.

We agree with Velleman's criticism of that crude Humean account. But the Humean need not, and should not, accept that role for belief. *The Humean certainly need not completely eliminate the role of imagination in generating pretense!* Any plausible Humean account of pretense will allow imagination some role in the production of pretense. For example, the Humean can deny Imagination-as-Motivation while preserving a role for imagination in the following manner: Children who pretend have a genuine desire to act out their imaginings. This latter type of Humean then allows for the pretense to be as creative as

²³Indeed, Currie and Ravenscroft, Anti-Humeans themselves, express their reservations about Velleman's argument in stating that, "In all sorts of situations we act skillfully and creatively on the basis of beliefs and desires that make little or no conscious impact on us." (2002, p. 124)

the child's imagination. In this spirit, we develop a (broadly) Humean account of pretense in section 4.

3.2.4. *The Humean and Anti-Humean are on par with problems concerning attitudes toward fictional narratives and attitudes toward fictional characters and situations.* It is true that the Humean's desire-to-pretend does not explain the unpleasant emotional reactions within the pretense. For example, the child's (supposedly) genuine desire to pretend that her iguana has a painful sunburn does not explain why she cries and grows sad over that fictional outcome. But this is one of the paradoxes of fiction that causes *everyone* problems. It may be true that a desire-like imagining can account for this emotional response to some extent, whereas the desire-to-pretend might not. Though, the desire-like imagining does not fully resolve the paradox of fiction — e.g., why does the child cry genuine tears for what she knows is a merely imaginary iguana? But note, there are two different things to be explained here. First, the pretense itself is to be explained. The question to be answered here is: Why is the child engaging in this pretense? Second, the emotional reactions (among others) are to be explained. The question to be answered here is: Given that the child is pretending, why does she react to the pretense in this manner?

It is not at all clear that the Humean must, or even should, reject desire-like imaginings as providing a partial answer to the second question. The Humean's main claim is that the first question is answered by referring to the desire-to-pretend. The Humean is then permitted some liberty in selecting a theory for the attitudes we bear toward fictional characters and situations. Importantly, the desire-like imaginings (assuming such things even exist) we have toward fictional characters and situations do not help in answering the first question. Let us grant that the child has the desire-like imagining that her imaginary iguana not suffer. This in no way explains why she is pretending that her iguana is suffering or why she *enjoys* so pretending. So, desire-like imaginings are not in competition with Humean desires-to-pretend on this score.

3.3. Motivation is not intrinsic to imaginings. Motivation is typically an intrinsic and essential feature of motivating states. For example, the motivational component of a desire is, at least typically, intrinsic to it, therefore it is no accident that desires motivate.²⁴ But

²⁴Why the 'typically' qualification? Because there are some exceptions — the desires we are indifferent to, say, due to depression. Again, see Stocker (1979). Such exceptions are not intrinsically or essentially motivating, as they do not motivate at all. Other examples might include desires that the agent believes she cannot satisfy for either logical or practical reasons. Examples here include desires to square the

imaginings, even the desire-like imaginings of Currie and Ravenscroft, are neither intrinsically nor essentially motivational. This suggests that they are not motivational at all.

Because the typical desire is intrinsically motivational, when a desire fails to lead to its expected action (given the agent's beliefs, etc.) this failure is typically explained by the presence of competing desires with greater strength or a privileged position in the agent's deliberation. For, if the motivation is not effective we should expect a contrary motivation or some inhibiting force in the agent's psyche. But desire-like imaginings would differ in this regard. If one has a desire-like imagining (say, to purchase a pink skirt at an exorbitant price) that fails to motivate, it typically is not the case that some competing imagining or desire overcomes its intrinsic motivational powers. Desire-like imaginings, such as we experience while daydreaming or viewing a play performed on the stage, provide no motivation to act in ways analogous to what would be appropriate were the desire genuine. In fact, this observation generates one of the paradoxes of fiction, as well as suggests its own solution. A theatergoer who has the prescribed desire-like imagining that Desdemona be saved has no motivation to actually save Desdemona. This theatergoer's imagining does not motivate *because* it is merely imaginary!²⁵

circle or to travel to a distant galaxy. (We thank an anonymous referee for these possibilities.) But if these "desires" do not motivate her at all (or even dispose her to such motivation), then for that very reason we think they are better classified as wishes. Alternatively, one could argue that such desires, in spite of the agent's beliefs, do motivate her to try to do *something* to satisfy them. But this issue is tangential to our central thesis. Our central thesis is that *if* a desire motivates, the motivation is intrinsic to the desire. Nothing about these desires that fail to motivate contradicts this assertion.

One might argue that the existence of such exceptions shows that desires *in general* are not intrinsically or essentially motivating. After all, if desires can fail to motivate, then it seems that there is something else (extrinsic to the desire) that bestows motivating power to them. But we find this form of argument implausible. When desires motivate, as they typically do, it is not in virtue of some additional feature. It is the desire itself that has intrinsic motivational powers. Here, we can add another level of dispositionality. Not all desires dispose or incline us towards action, but all desires that can be satisfied by the agent have the disposition to so dispose. So we allow that there are some desires that are not intrinsically motivating, but they typically are intrinsically motivating.

²⁵This account of desire-like imaginings is due to Walton (1990), though he writes of quasi-emotions rather than desire-like imaginings.

It is only when accompanied by pretense, it then seems, that the Imagination-as-Motivation advocate takes imagination to be motivating. But this means that the imagination behind pretense is fundamentally different from the imagination used in daydreaming and in appreciating public fictions, as well as the many other contexts in which imagination is non-motivational. Assuming that the Imagination-as-Motivation theorist grants that desire-like imaginings are not motivational in these other contexts, such a theorist is committed to some desire-like imaginings being (intrinsically) motivational and other desire-like imaginings being non-motivational. Or they could insist that even in settings like theaters, desire-like imaginings do motivate toward actions analogous to that appropriate were the imagining real. With Walton, we think this is implausible. Not only is this a fragmented picture of the imagination, but it also violates the general principle, which we are endorsing, that the motivational powers of a mental state type are intrinsic to typical members of that type.

Currie and Ravenscroft do anticipate the objection raised in this subsection. But, we find their preemptive response unsatisfying. They consider how the passive daydreamer and active pretender seem to differ in the motivation offered by the imagination. We have stressed that cases like those of the passive daydreamer and theatergoer suggest that motivation is typically not intrinsic to imagination. Currie and Ravenscroft respond by making reference to the holism of the mental:

So while the passive daydreamer and the active war game player may not differ in their imaginings, they will differ in their relevant mental backgrounds: The game player really desires to play a game, really believes that she is playing a game, and the passive imaginer does not have that belief or that desire. So there will be many potentially relevant differences between the game player and the passive imaginer, and we may be able to explain the behavioural differences between them by appeal to one or other of these differences.²⁶

But this response actually supports the *denial* of the Imagination-as-Motivation Thesis. We see their response as admitting, if not intentionally, that the real motivation for the pretense is provided by the background beliefs and desires of the agent. After all, they cite the agents' *real* beliefs and desires in explaining their behavioral differences. Further, if our general principle is correct and motivation is intrinsic to typical members of a motivational kind, then Currie and

²⁶Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), p. 118.

Ravenscroft need to argue that the daydreamer has some motivation from his imagination that is overcome or inhibited by other factors in his psychology. But they do not do this.

Velleman does advance this more aggressive strategy, however. We interpret him as arguing that imagination is intrinsically motivational, though in adults this motivating influence is normally inhibited by a reality-testing procedure. Velleman claims that imagination is no longer (effectively) motivating for adults because we have segregated and inhibited most of our conative states that set fantastic or otherwise unattainable goals. This is supposed to explain why it is that adults “have difficulty joining wholeheartedly into this activity [make-believe]”.²⁷

We have several objections to this proposal. First, reasonable doubt can be raised concerning whether adults really do have difficulty wholeheartedly entering into make-believe. True, adults are less inclined to engage in make-believe, but this is a different point. From our personal experiences, adults can make-believe with the same sincerity and creativity as is found in children. But second, rather than holding that motivation is intrinsic to an inhibited imagination, the lack of a desire to so pretend (or social pressures, or some other reason external to the imagination) can explain the inhibition towards pretense. Third, it is not obvious that pretending children differ from adults in that they lack this inhibition toward the fantastic. Empirical evidence is desirable here, but it is at least not obvious that children sincerely pursue unattainable wishes. Fourth, it is simply not always the case that children who pretend have an unrealistic longing for that which they are pretending. In imagination we, children included, take on desires that are not our own. But these desire-like imaginings are not simply unattainable, far-fetched longings — e.g., our desire-like imaginings may be for something that we do not actually want to obtain. For this reason, it is implausible that make-believe is motivated by a wish. We often make-believe and pretend things that we do not wish to be true.

3.4. The motivation for pretense can change, though the imagining remains fixed. Conversely, the imagining behind pretense can change, though the motivation remains fixed. In our original story Cassi is motivated by a desire to pretend for its own sake. But we can change the story, so that Cassi is instead motivated to pretend out of peer pressure — she simply wants to do what Stacey and Kelcey are doing. In such a case she can nevertheless have the same

²⁷Velleman (2000), p. 262.

imaginings that gave her pretense its particular flavor in the original version. One could insist that if the motivation has changed the imagination has changed as well, but this simply does not seem *necessary*. Of course we are simply stipulating here that something external to the imagination is motivational. But our point is that this is a coherent case, which suggests that the motivation for pretense is independent of imaginative content and attitude.²⁸

We could also describe two situations in which Cassi is motivated to pretend out of peer pressure, but her accompanying imaginings differ. Due to this difference in imagination, her pretense actions differ, even though they arise from the same motivational type. This sameness of motivation through difference in imagination also suggests that motivation is insensitive to imaginative content and attitude.

One could respond that these examples merely show that imagination is not motivational in these particular examples. And Currie and Ravenscroft concede that there can be pretense that is not motivated by imagination. However, these cases establish more than this. They show that imagination is generally irrelevant to determining motivation. Such cases also provide further support for the claim that motivation is not intrinsic to imagination.

3.5. Pretense is to be classified with other actions that do not violate the Belief-Desire or Desire-as-Motivation Theses.

The Humean account gains greater plausibility if it can be shown that imagination-driven pretense is relevantly like other actions in which the Humean account holds. Finding analogues to imagination, in non-pretense actions, allows us to generalize and offer an account of the motivation and guidance of action — an account that may require modifications of the Humean picture. We pursue this strategy in the next section.

4. IMAGINATION AS SCRIPT: GUIDING, BUT NOT MOTIVATING

So far we have argued that it is implausible that imagination provides the motivation for pretense. In this section we sketch our positive account of the motivation for pretense, as well as the role we assign to imagination. On our view imagination *guides* pretense rather than *motivating* it, so some account of this distinction should be, and is, offered. Our account gains greater plausibility in virtue of its applications to actions besides pretense. In this section we also use the discussion of

²⁸We thank Jack Lyons for this way of putting the objection.

imagination and pretense as a springboard for various programmatic suggestions for action theory.

We have assumed throughout that pretense is a kind of action. This is not trivial, as not every bit of human behavior or movement counts as an action as we are using the term. This usage is not idiosyncratic, of course, and we assume the following as three inter-connected marks of action: Actions allow for reasons-explanations, are performed intentionally (under some description), and are things for which the agent is to be held accountable (other things being equal). In at least one of these regards, actions differ from tics, mannerisms, mere happenings, autonomic behaviors, etc. Though the division between action and non-action is not always sharp, we submit that pretense possesses these marks and counts as action. In defense of this claim, this section develops an account of the reasons-explanations for imagination-driven pretense.

4.1. Guiders and Motivators. Let us consider action explanations at the greatest level of abstraction, while attempting to remain neutral on the details. The Belief-Desire and Desire-as-Motivation Theses from section 1 offer rather specific proposals concerning the genesis of action, though we said at that time that they can also be read in a broader sense. According to the narrow reading of the Belief-Desire Thesis, all actions are caused by a belief-desire pair *as opposed to* their near relatives — other representational, say, or pro-attitude states. Broader readings, in contrast, offer more general substitutes in place of ‘belief’ and ‘desire’, though maintaining the spirit. These broader categories include belief and desire as just some of the determinates of the two, more psychologically basic, determinable kinds. We propose that these broader kinds are *natural* kinds because they are at the relevant level of abstraction to cover all actions. In particular, we offer the following modification as a substitute for both the Belief-Desire and Motivation-as-Desire Theses:

Guider-Motivator Thesis: For every intentional action there is a guider-motivator pair that both causes and rationalizes that intentional action. No guider itself is sufficient for motivating action. Likewise, no motivator itself is sufficient for guiding action.

Beliefs and desires are the paradigm examples of guiders and motivators, though there are many others as discussed below. Our examination of pretense will lead us to embrace this thesis as a necessary modification of our original version of the HTM.

So, what is the nature of these broader categories, guiders and motivators, of which beliefs and desires are determinates? Unfortunately, we do not have a rigorous means for marking this distinction, but we will refer to common philosophical metaphors in hopes that they will continue to convey an intuitive understanding of these two roles that we hold to be necessary for causing and rationalizing action.²⁹ Again, we aim for wide acceptance of our categorization and revised HTM, and believe that it should be accepted by those with otherwise varied accounts of action explanations.

Consider first those who accept versions of the Humean picture according to which action is the end result of various forces acting on the mind in a rather Newtonian manner. Let this serve as an example of a *causal account* of reason-explanations. Others reject this conception of motivating states. Instead of seeing motivators as *pushing* us towards action, they see motivators as providing us with ends, goals, or projects that, metaphorically, *pull* us toward certain actions. Let us call these *teleological accounts* of reason-explanations. Regardless of which account one accepts, one can still make sense of the guider-motivator distinction. Different theorists can pick-and-choose their favored account, analogies, and vocabulary, but we offer the following list as a starter:

Guiders: “the maps by which we steer”; directors; means-selectors; etc.

Motivators: the thrust or impulse behind action; ends or goals; projects; etc.

In short, motivators provide the thrust or pick the destination, and guiders direct or tell us how to get there.

4.2. Imagination-as-Script. Let us now consider pretense in light of our broader HTM. Importantly, we do not interpret Currie, Ravenscroft, or Velleman as denying our Guider-Motivator Thesis. One way of denying the Guider-Motivator Thesis would be to provide a single state of imagination that both guides and motivates pretense. Neither

²⁹They are not sufficient for causing action as intention (the will, an executor, etc.) is needed as well. Plus there are cases of weakness of the will, depression and other psychological maladies, and lower-level physical implementation “defeaters”, each of which can thwart the actualizing of rational action even in cases where that action is willed. These other mental features that contribute to the causation of action in no way rationalize the action, however. The rationalization of action is exhausted by guider-motivator pairs.

Currie, Ravenscroft, nor Velleman make any such claim for imagination, however. Rather, we interpret them as holding that some imaginings are guiders and others are motivators, though no single imagining occupies both roles.³⁰ In speaking of belief-like and desire-like imaginings (or mock-beliefs and mock-desires) *in conjunction*, their position is compatible with our broader HTM.

If Currie, Ravenscroft, and Velleman agree with the Guider-Motivator Thesis, then where does our disagreement emerge? The debate has now focused to this: Currie, Ravenscroft, and Velleman argue that *some* imaginings (or wishes) are motivators, whereas we argued against this in section 3. Given that we reject Imagination-as-Motivation, we should address the following two questions. What are the motivators for pretense? And what role(s) *can* imagination play in pretense? Our positive account of pretense consists in answering these questions.

Nichols and Stich (2000, 2003) offer the standard, Humean motivational alternative to Imagination-as-Motivation. Their account of pretense motivation is *monistic*.

Pretenders behave the way they do because they *want to behave in a way that is similar to the way some character or object behaves in the possible world whose description is contained in the Possible World Box* [e.g., imagination].³¹

While we accept that much pretense might have such a motivation, we prefer a *pluralistic* account. We allow, for example, that children can pretend according to their imagination without wanting to behave as the characters in their imagination behave. And we see no reason to think that the motivation for pretense is unitary. (After all, what other broad category of action has a single type of motivation?) It should also be emphasized that at its developmental onset pretense likely does not have a cognitively rich motivation. There is much evidence that the drive to pretend is innate, as such behavior universally emerges in developmentally normal babies sometime between 18 and 24 months of age.³² Early childhood pretense, then, likely has a motivation of a brutally biological, and not cognitively-rich, nature. This does not take away from its being action, however. A baby who reaches for a Cheerio

³⁰Currie is explicit about this: “We might resist the idea that there are desire-like imaginings as well as belief-like ones by saying that imagining is a unitary state that incorporates elements both of belief and desire in it, in which case it would be better to speak of ‘imaginary besires’. But the belief-like and desire-like elements in imagination do seem to be separable.” Currie (2002), pp. 204–205.

³¹Nichols and Stich (2003), p. 37 (italics in original).

³²Lillard (2002), p. 188.

is acting intentionally, though its motivation is provided by a simple, innate appetite.

Like Currie and Ravenscroft, among other participants in the pretense debate, we acknowledge that there can be pretense without imagination playing any guiding or motivating role, and that there can even be pretense absent any imagination at all. At issue is the type of contribution the imagination makes to pretense when it obviously is making *some* causal contribution. Since imagination is not a motivator, but it clearly directs some pretense, our position is that imagination can be, and often is, a guider. Philosophy of action has long been hindered by narrow-mindedly focusing on belief and not paying adequate attention to the great variety of guiders. Belief and knowledge are paradigm examples of guiders, but there are other situations in which states that do not aim at the truth, and even non-mental states, guide action. Let us introduce the term *script* to cover guiders that provide a model for action. A script, unlike the typical belief used in means-end reasoning, is something that can be imitated or enacted. Significantly, these scripts can sometimes guide action without being mediated by a belief or knowledge state. We claim that imagination, in its role of guiding pretense, can be one such script.³³

The word ‘script’ is chosen with the connotations of physical scripts, as for plays and movies, in mind. Professional actors engage in pretense, pretending to be someone or in some situation that they are not, but it is typically not their own imaginations that guide their actions. Rather, they typically act out scenes that were written as the product of someone *else’s* imagination. Such physical scripts serve as scripts in our technical sense as well — they guide the actions of the actor without motivating them. (Of course, the actor’s imagination has some influence on how the script is interpreted and acted out.) A straightforward belief-desire story fails to explain the creative aspects of the actor’s behavior. The words on the script guide the actor’s actions without the mediation of beliefs, producing the actor’s utterances and movements straight away. It would be dogmatic and superfluous to insist that they do so by causing a belief with the content “This is what the playwright wants me to say now.” Instead, the physical script takes over the role usually reserved for belief. But, consistent with our

³³Our use of ‘script’ should be contrasted with its use in psychology (e.g., Abelson (1981)) to refer to a stereotype for behavior. Our scripts, such as beliefs and imaginings, do not fit this definition. There are certainly things besides stereotypes that guide action, so obviously our usage is broader than this established use of ‘script’ from psychology. (Though we think that our use includes many stereotypes — see section 4.3). Our scripts also should not be thought of as inflexible or pre-set.

division between guiders and motivators, the physical script does not directly provide the actor with a motivation to act.

Pretense can be guided by physical scripts, and we take the comparison of imagination to physical scripts seriously.³⁴ Professional acting is typically accounted for by a desire to act (e.g., for its own sake, as a way to earn money or adoration, etc.), a script, and a general belief that following the script is a good means of achieving the end specified as the content of the desire.³⁵ Similarly, the children's pretense is often accounted for by a desire to pretend (e.g., for its own sake, as a way to socialize with others, etc.), the imagination that guides it, and a general belief that following the imagination is a good means of achieving the end specified as the content of the desire.

As stated earlier, many things besides imagination can guide pretense, even when imagination is involved. For example, children engaged in pretense are often guided by social norms, such as those regarding appropriate behavior for doctors or mothers. These social norms, to the extent that they provide a model for action, can count as scripts. Likewise, children engaged in group pretense can be guided by the behavior of the other children, either by imitating their behavior or taking their behavior as cues for other acts of pretense. It is relatively rare for the imagination to serve as a pre-written script, as it were, for the child or adult then to act out. Often the pretender's imagination is influenced by environmental changes, suggestions by other pretenders, or various other external factors.³⁶ In fact, pretense can direct imagination just as well as imagination can direct pretense. Philosophers often neglect or otherwise under-appreciate this mutual interaction.

³⁴As far as its motivation is concerned, we deny that there is a fundamental difference between the pretense of children and that of adults. Of course, adults will have different motives in virtue of having different concepts, ambitions, etc., but this is beside the point. This view contrasts with that of Velleman (2000), which argues that young children, but not adults, are motivated to pretend directly by their imagination (pp. 262–263). In contrast, we are offering a unified account of pretense.

³⁵It is important to realize that the specific nature of the actor's behaviors — the words she says, her entrance and exit, etc. — are not accounted for by beliefs. The script guides her to these words, entrances, and exits, without mediation by her beliefs. In this sense, they provide a model for action. Again, it would be old-fashioned Humean dogmatism to insist that the actor also has some belief to the effect that “The playwright wants me to enter now, then say such-and-such, and then exit”. Instead, the script guides straight away.

³⁶See, for example, Walton's (1990) account of props as generators of fictional truths (pp. 35–43, in particular).

With these various examples of scripts at hand, we can already make some significant distinctions. First, scripts, and guiders more generally, can be either *internal* or *external*, where this refers to the location of the script relative to the agent. An internal script is one that is “inside” the agent (such as an imagination), and an external script is one that is “outside” the agent (such as a physical script, the behavior of another individual, or a social norm). We anticipate that our commitment to external scripts will be met with some degree of skepticism. Recall that scripts can play the guiding role in the Guider-Motivator Thesis. So, by admitting external scripts we are claiming that things outside the agent sometimes play an ineliminable role, unmediated by belief or knowledge, in both causing and rationalizing action. Many will admit that external states of affairs can provide *normative* reasons for action, but we go well beyond this in claiming that external states of affairs can provide *motivating* reasons and causal explanations for actions.³⁷ These external scripts must be perceived in some sense, or at least causally connected to the agent, in order to guide her behavior. But we find no reason to think that this perception must rise to the level of a belief. Imagination and screenplays provide examples of scripts, one internal and the other external, that guide without the mediation of belief. (Other examples of external scripts are provided in section 4.3.)

So that which directly guides our actions can extend out into the world beyond our skins. This claim is similar to the “extended mind” thesis advanced by Andy Clark and David Chalmers, among many others.³⁸ Though we are not yet inclined to judge these external scripts *mental* states, we view this as something of a verbal dispute. As a substantive metaphysical and methodological point, we agree with the extended mind camp that our actions are sometimes (directly) guided

³⁷In this regard, our view resembles the role Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (1992) allows for external normative rules, or even the behavior of others, in guiding our actions. He writes: “Normative rules can figure as well, though, in explanations where their effects on a person’s behavior are unmediated by her beliefs about the rules. Sticking with the example of traffic laws, we might explain why a particular person is driving within the speed limit by noting that she is disposed to drive at roughly the same speed as those around her, and that those around her have slowed to 55 mph because they noticed what she did not — a new speed limit sign.” (61) We prefer to think of the driving behavior of others as the relevant script here, though there might be cases in which normative rules directly rationalize and causally explain action. Our view is a generalization of his point. Many external things, not just normative rules, can causally/rationally explain our actions without mediation by belief.

³⁸See Clark and Chalmers (1998) and Clark (2003).

by external factors. Clark and Chalmers have argued that in at least some cases things like notebooks and calculators can be seen as extensions of our memory and cognition. The idea is that in some situations these external artifacts occupy the very same role as our internal memory and cognition. We are making a similar point with regard to imagination. There are external artifacts — physical scripts, for example, that introduce the imaginings of another into the public sphere — that play the very same role as our internal imagination. Physical scripts surely do not provide motivation, but they can guide our actions. And so too for our imagination.³⁹

Secondly, we can also distinguish between *truth-directed* and *non-truth-directed* scripts, and guiders more generally. Guiders that aim at the truth (such as beliefs and knowledge⁴⁰) are truth-directed, and guiders that do not aim at the truth (such as imagination and the behavior of another) are non-truth-directed. Note that for many guiders, especially external ones, the question of their truth-directedness is unnatural. For example, we do not think of social norms or the behavior of another person as possible candidates for truth evaluation. But failing to be either true or false is one way of being a non-truth-directed guider. While a social norm or somebody's behavior cannot be true or false, they can be appropriate or inappropriate. If, as we have claimed, these things can also be scripts, then truth is not always the relevant standard for evaluating guiders. Instead, guiders should be evaluated by a more general standard of appropriateness. This observation should help towards eliminating the ideal of truth as the governing norm for the guiding aspect of action. Perhaps, for this very reason, we should not even have truth serve as our governing standard for belief.

It is advantageous to step away from the particular example of imagination-driven pretense and consider the general account of action that is being offered. Consistent with the Guider-Motivator Thesis, we hold that a guider-motivator pair serves as the rationalization and

³⁹One might worry that the constituents of reasons-explanations must possess propositional content, and that these external scripts are not the kinds of things that can possess propositional content. We prefer to argue in the other direction, citing external scripts as evidence that the constituents of reasons-explanations need not bear propositional content. Of course, this is a significant and controversial claim, with obvious analogues in epistemology, that we will not defend here. But, note that our position should also be welcomed by those who hold that the non-propositional elements of imaginings can guide our pretense.

⁴⁰It is awkward, and perhaps inappropriate in some sense, to speak of knowledge as truth-directed given that it necessarily hits its target. But, please allow us this broader use. Truth-directed guiders either aim at or necessarily hit their targets.

causation behind all action. Belief-desire pairs are the paradigm examples of guider-motivator pairs, but we have suggested that there is a much broader and more diverse class of guiders than is customarily permitted. In particular, we recognize rationalizations and causes of action that have the following forms:

- (1) Internal Guider(s) + Motivator(s) \rightarrow Action
Tony pretends to be a bird in flight because he desires to act out his imaginings and he is imagining that he is a bird in flight.
- (2) External Guider(s) + Motivator(s) \rightarrow Action
Tony pretends to be a bird in flight because he desires to participate in a group pretense with his friends, and his friends are pretending to be birds in flight.
- (3) Internal + External Guider(s) + Motivator(s) \rightarrow Action
Tony pretends to be a bird in flight because he desires to make new friends, believes that participating in their activities is a good way to make new friends, and these friends are pretending to be birds in flight.

As these examples illustrate, pretense and non-pretense actions can have an explanation fitting any one of these three forms.

Some will feel uneasy about admitting external guiders. Actions are supposed to be done *by* the agent *for*, or *out of*, her reasons, and one might worry that by placing part of this motivating reason, the guider, outside of the agent she loses too much accountability or control of the behavior for it to still count as action. We do not think this is the case, however. Even if Tony's action is guided exclusively by the behavior of others, as in example 2 above, Tony can still be fully in control of his pretense, as well as fully accountable for it. His behavior can still possess our three marks of action. And admitting example 2 as an example of action is also consistent with a requirement that something be "inside" the agent for it to count as action. In this example Tony possesses a robust internal state, the motivating desire, and there is still some recognition or perception of the other children's behavior that is internal to him.

Given that guiders can be either internal or external, it is natural to suppose that there are motivators of both varieties as well. Motivators include goals and impulses, so an external motivator would be a goal or impulse that is not provided from within. Examples of external motivators, if such there are, could then include: governmental mandates, objective ethical duties, biological need (understood as

extending beyond the individual), etc. Perhaps the motivation for pretense sometimes comes from without, though we remain divided, or at least uncertain, regarding the existence of such external motivators.

4.3. Beyond Pretense: Other Scripts. There are actions similar to pretense, though the scripts that guide these actions are not provided by the imagination (or anything belief-like). We close this section by briefly considering some of these examples, with which pretense is appropriately grouped.

Some pretense can be thought of as a game of mimicry. Let us consider another game of mimicry — the “mirror game”. In the mirror game two people stand facing one another. One of them acts as a mirror, aiming to copy the free bodily movements of the other. The “mirror’s” movements, we assert, should be counted as action — e.g., they certainly seem to be done intentionally, oftentimes accompanied with deep concentration. But they occur within an artificial context in which something besides belief guides the action. Just as it was dogmatic for the Humean to claim that the actor’s movements could only be explained by positing beliefs about the playwright’s intentions, so too with the mirror game. The physical script guides straight away, and so do the mirror’s movements. Also, the mere fact that the “mirror’s” responses occur so quickly offers some reason to believe that they are not mediated by belief. This is mimicry guided by the behavior of the other, where this other person’s bodily movements serve as an external script. Our claim has been that the imagination can play a role in pretense similar to that of the actor’s movements in the mirror game. Each provides a model for imitation or enactment.

We can extend this point beyond the artificial environment of a game. Many of our real-world actions involve mimicry of some type — such as the taking on of a social role, succumbing to peer pressure, following a role model, or serving as a master’s apprentice. These too can serve as external scripts. Admittedly, in some cases the taking on of a social role or the following of a role model can seem unintentional and beyond the limits of action. But we often hold people accountable for such (in)decisions and actions. (Think of the existentialist’s admonition against acting in bad faith.) The child who follows the group is to be blamed, and the apprentice who emulates his master is to be praised. And the child who pretends, with imagination as her guide and master, is not so radically different from the apprentice who mimics his master.

Scripts operate differently from the paradigm guiders, belief and knowledge. Our beliefs and knowledge guide or direct us toward some course of action without providing us with a model for action. And

scripts do not necessarily provide us with premises *from which* we reason, nor are they necessarily conclusions *to which* we have reasoned. But this does not take away from their ability to provide reasons for action. A comparison to epistemic justification might be helpful here. Scripts are somewhat like appeals to authority. With an appeal to authority we accept something as a reason for belief without doing any reasoning ourselves. Instead, the belief of another is taken as a proper model for belief. Similarly, scripts are not the product of reasoning, but serve as models for action.

5. CONCLUSION

Our aim has been two-fold. First, we have offered a defense of broadly Humean accounts of action by arguing against Imagination-as-Motivation accounts of pretense. Such proposals are motivated by uncharitable or simply mistaken interpretations of the Humean position, and are implausible in their own right. Second, we have gone some way toward advancing a positive theory of the role imagination can play in the production of pretense. We believe that insight into this role is best attained by categorizing pretense with other actions that are not handily accounted for by narrow versions of the HTM. The existence of such classes of action does not signal the demise of the HTM, but rather suggests modifications like those advanced in section 4. Pretense is just one among many kinds of action guided by scripts. Any plausible Humean account of action will therefore replace talk of beliefs and desires with broader psychological kinds that include such scripts, as well as belief and knowledge.⁴¹

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⁴¹We thank Dustin Stokes and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments on this paper.

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