

PHIL 3923H: Honors Colloquium on Free Will
Prof. Funkhouser
11/30/06

FINAL EXAM REVIEW

Your final exam will be worth 300 points, allocated as follows. You will answer 6 of 7 shorter answer questions, worth 30 points each. Then, you will answer 2 of 3 longer answer questions, worth 60 points each. The questions will be drawn from the topics provided below. The vast majority of the material will be from the readings assigned since the second midterm. Though, there is some material from earlier in the semester that could be covered as well. This material is listed below.

The final exam will take place Thursday, December 7th, from 7:30 to 9:30 a.m. Bring at least one “blue book”, and make sure not to write in it prior to the examination.

F&R, Chapter 1: causal responsibility and moral responsibility; reactive attitudes; Strawsonian vs. ledger views of moral responsibility; Direct and Indirect Arguments for incompatibilism (of determinism and moral responsibility); the Principle of the Transfer of Powerlessness

F&R, Chapter 2: guidance control and regulative control (examples: Assassin and Sally driving the car); responsibility-undermining factors; *Why* do these responsibility-undermining factors take away responsibility?; actual-sequence accounts; mechanisms; strong reasons-responsiveness; recognition, choice, and action; objections to strong reasons-responsiveness (e.g., counter-examples); weak reasons-responsiveness; examples: irresistible drugs and drunk drivers; the “tracing” clause; semi-compatibilism

F&R, Chapter 3: objection to weak reasons-responsiveness — the Problem of Strange Patterns (e.g., saber-man); receptivity and reactivity; strong receptivity and weak reactivity; moderate reasons-responsiveness; moral reasons and prudential reasons

F&R, Chapter 4: examples that seem to show that an agent is not morally responsible for a consequence simply because she could not have prevented it (as well as examples in which an agent *is* morally responsible for a conse-

quence, though she could not have prevented it); consequence-particulars and consequence-universals; guidance control of consequence-particulars; guidance control of consequence-universals (2 stages); Frankfurt-style cases for consequence-universals; triggering events and background conditions (and relevance to “sensitivity of the outer path”)

F&R, Chapter 5: the contrast between these puzzling cases (among others): Sloth and Forest Ranger 2; bodily and complex omissions (and guidance control of each)

F&R, Chapter 6: the Principle of the Transfer of Non-Responsibility; the Direct Argument; Avalanche; Ensuring Conditions; Joint Assassins

F&R, Chapter 7: historical and non-historical phenomena; non-historical accounts of moral responsibility (e.g., Frankfurt and Humean accounts); epistemic vs. genuine historicism; 2 cases to support the claim that moral responsibility is historical: drunk driver and hypnosis

F&R, Chapter 8: the process of moral education: recognition of agency, recognition of the appropriateness of reactive attitudes (from others), and the internalization of these reactive attitudes; the “moral conversation” metaphor; our treatment of those who do not take responsibility; objections to F&R’s account of taking responsibility, and their replies (section V.); subjectivist theories of moral responsibility; their positions on the moral responsibility of victims of various forms of psychological manipulation

F&R, Chapter 9: extending the guidance control account to emotional reactions

Earlier Material: see connections between F&R and our earlier readings from van Inwagen and Frankfurt; in particular: compare F&R’s Indirect and Direct arguments for incompatibilism to van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument; compare F&R’s discussion of the Principle of the Transfer of Powerlessness and the Principle of Transfer of Non-Responsibility to similar principles and discussion from van Inwagen; contrast F&R’s historical account of moral responsibility with Frankfurt’s non-historical account (and their differing reactions to various forms of manipulation); compare F&R and Frankfurt on regulative control, the irrelevance of alternative possibilities to moral responsibility, and the role of Frankfurt-style cases