PHIL 4603: Metaphysics
Prof. Funkhouser
12/1/05

FINAL EXAM REVIEW

Your final exam will be worth 250 points, allocated as follows. There will be 4 mandatory, shorter answer questions worth 25 points each. These will consist of one question from each of our last 4 units — modality, persistence through time, personal identity, and realism. Then, there will be 4 longer answer questions (again, one each from each of our 4 units). But you will answer only 3 of these 4, worth 50 points each.

The final exam questions will be drawn from the questions provided below. The questions on the final exam might not appear exactly as they appear below, but there will be a close match. I also might combine some of these sample questions to form a longer question on the final. You might also be asked to make connections between different authors and topics. I expect you to understand the material, as opposed to merely memorizing blurbs.

The exam is Friday, December 9th, in our regular classroom, from 7:30 a.m. till 9:30 a.m. Bring at least 2 or 3 blue books for your exam.

Modality

Plantinga:
- Explain the difference between de re and de dicto modality. Provide examples that illustrate each.
- Explain Kneale and Quine’s objections to de re modality (143–147). What are Plantinga’s responses to the “number of apostles” and “mathematical cyclist” arguments/examples?

Lewis:
- Explain Lewis’s genuine modal realist + counterpart theory account of de re representation/modality.
- Provide Kripke’s “Humphrey Objection” to counterpart theory. What is Lewis’s response? Explain what Lewis means when he says that the Humphrey Objection would have more weight were it coming from a genuine modal realist who allowed for overlap.
• What is the problem of accidental intrinsics? The problem of temporary intrinsics?
• Explain the analogies between space, time, and modality when it comes to an object’s spatial extent, identity through time, and transworld identity. Why does Lewis think that ordinary objects are 4-dimensional worms with temporal parts, but not transworld worms with other-worldly parts?
• What is Lewis’s argument for unrestricted mereological composition? (Be sure you also explain what unrestricted mereological composition amounts to!)

Adams:
• What is an haecceity? What is the “question of haecceities” (see handout)? What relevance would haecceities have to the Identity of Indiscernibles?

Persistence through Time

Chisholm:
• Explain how the distinction between the loose and strict senses of identity, along with the idea that ordinary objects are “logical constructions”, is supposed to offer a solution to Ship of Theseus problems.

Quine:
• Does Quine think we can step in the same river twice? If so, in what sense? If not, why not?
• How do 4-dimensionalists and 3-dimensionalists each handle the problem of temporary intrinsics (see also Lewis, above)?
• Explain Quine’s 4-dimensionalism, and the role played by a sortal-relative relation such as river kinship. Explain the ambiguities of reference that arise from ostensive naming (e.g., ambiguities in spatial or temporal extent, the relevant sortal, etc.).

Thomson:
• Define a fusion and mereological essentialism, and then explain the relation between these concepts.
• Does the 4-dimensionalist really offer an account of change?
• Explain Thomson’s “crazy metaphysic” objection to 4-dimensionalism. Is it any good? Why, or why not?
\textit{Heller}: 
- Evaluate Heller’s 5 step argument for 4-dimensionalism. (313) Are any of the 5 alternatives to accepting the conclusion (Heller’s (a)-(e)) attractive? 
- Explain how 4-dimensionalism is supposed to offer a solution to fission/fusion cases.

\textbf{Personal Identity}

\textit{Shoemaker}: 
- Explain how “branching” cases (e.g., fission or fusion) provide difficulties for Lockean accounts of personal identity (e.g., memory or psychological continuity theories).
- What is quasi-remembering “from the inside”? 
- Is Shoemaker’s exception for branching cases, in his account of personal identity, \textit{ad hoc}? Even if you do not think it is \textit{ad hoc}, explain why one might think so.

\textit{Williams}: 
- Do you think Williams is explaining the very same case in two different ways (e.g., body transfer or mind transfer), or are these two different cases? Defend your answer.
- Provide Williams’s case for the bodily continuity (or, at least, against the psychological continuity) account of personal identity.
- Are people different from other things, such that \textit{conventionalism} is an unacceptable option for personal identity though it might be acceptable for other things? Explain Williams’s reasons for thinking that conventionalism about personal identity is unacceptable.

\textit{Parfit}: 
- Provide one of Parfit’s examples of survival without identity. Explain why he thinks identity is not “what matters”. 
- Compare and contrast Parfit with Shoemaker on branching (e.g., fission) cases. 
- Why does Parfit think psychological continuity (as opposed to psychological connectedness) is \textit{not} sufficient for personal identity \textit{even if} there is no branching and there are no strange (or absent) causal dependencies connecting one person-stage with the next?
**Johnston:**
- What is the relevance of the human being/human organism distinction as made by Johnston? (Make sure that you also explain the distinction.)
- Why does Johnston hold that a person cannot survive teletransportation?

**Realism**

**Putnam:**
- Define *Scientific Realism*, *intrinsic property*, and *projected property*.
- What about Realism (with a capital ‘R’) does Putnam reject? Explain by discussing an example. In what sense does Putnam nevertheless claim to be a *realist*?
- What does the ‘internal’ in ‘internal realism’ refer to?
- Explain what Putnam is claiming in this passage: “And it is no accident that metaphysical realism cannot really recognize the phenomenon of conceptual relativity — for that phenomenon turns on the fact that the logical primitives themselves, and in particular the notions of object and existence, have a multitude of different uses rather than one absolute ‘meaning.’” (597)
- What is the “cookie cutter” metaphor, and why does Putnam think it is not helpful in explaining conceptual relativity? (603)

**Sosa:**
- What does Putnam (the Putnam of “Pragmatic Realism”) think about the prospects of a finished science, and what relevance does he think this has for Realism?
- Compare and/or contrast Putnam with Carnap regarding truth relative to a linguistic framework.
- Is Putnam accusing metaphysical disputants (e.g., those arguing over mereology) of talking past one another in a merely *verbal dispute*? What more could be made of Putnam’s criticism?

**Alston:**
- Alston writes that: “If what I did in a certain utterance was to refer to snow and say of it that it is white, what alternative is there to holding that my statement is true iff snow is white?” (627) But is the anti-realist obligated to look for such an alternative? Explain why, or why not.