

PHIL 3923H: Honors Colloquium on Free Will
Prof. Funkhouser
10/31/06

EXAM #2 REVIEW

Your second midterm exam will be worth 200 points, allocated as follows. You will answer 5 of 6 shorter answer questions, worth 20 points each. Then, you will answer 2 of 3 longer answer questions, worth 50 points each. The questions will be drawn from the topics provided below. It will take place Thursday, November 2nd, during our regular class time. Bring at least one “blue book”, and make sure not to write in it prior to the examination.

Frankfurt, Chapter 1: Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP); conditions that are sufficient for an outcome and conditions that bring it about; Why (if at all) does coercion take away moral responsibility?; the 4 variants of the Jones story; the importance of acting for one’s own reasons; Frankfurt’s revision of PAP

PVI, Chapter 5 (§5.1–5.5): the “ought implies can” principle; PPA and the example about the person who doesn’t call the police; PP1, and why PVI thinks that his Gunnar example is not a counter-example to it

Frankfurt, Chapter 2: first-order desires, second-order desires, and second-order volitions; Frankfurt’s conception of a person; the will and effective desires; wantons; the unwilling and the wanton narcotics addicts; Frankfurt’s accounts of free will and free action; the virtues of Frankfurt’s account of free will; Frankfurt and the compatibilism/incompatibilism dispute

Frankfurt, Chapter 3: physical coercion and coercion of the will; threats and offers; Nozick’s account of threats, and Frankfurt’s objections; Frankfurt’s 3 conditions for a threat; Frankfurt’s claim that coercion requires the absence of choice (not just the absence of reasonable choice); coercion and irresistible threats; possible objection: Is the fact that a threat is irresistible sufficient to establish coercion?; the possibility of coercive offers; coercion and Frankfurt’s account of free will

Frankfurt, Chapter 4: Type A, B, and C cases; the willing and unwilling addict, again; the devil/neurologist examples; Frankfurt on the irrelevance

of causal origins to questions of moral responsibility and free will

Frankfurt, Chapter 5: activity/passivity; activity and action; applying the active/passive distinction to mental phenomena; Frankfurt's supposed examples of passive thoughts/passions; Is approving of a passion enough to make it one's own (i.e., internal)?; the infinite regress worry; rejecting a desire

Frankfurt, Chapter 6: the problem of action; causal theories of action, and Frankfurt's main objections to them; action, purposive movement and intentional movement; guidance control and alien forces