

PHIL 4233: Philosophy of Language  
Prof. Funkhouser  
Kaplan, "Quantifying In"

## Background

- Let's recall, from our last Quine reading, what Kaplan's title is referring to. Look back at (7), (8), (12), and (13).

No question arises over (8); it exhibits only a quantification *within* the "believes that" context, not a quantification *into* it. What goes by the board, when we rule (12) and (13) both true, is just (7). Yet we are scarcely prepared to sacrifice the relational construction "There is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy," which (7) as against (8) was supposed to reproduce.

- Let's also recall Quine's terminology about *opaque contexts* and *purely referential* terms:

Opaque context: A context in which truth is not always preserved by substituting co-referential terms. Words in such contexts, which refuse such substitution, are not "purely referential". Contexts which are not opaque are *transparent*.

- The Kaplan article pits Quine against Frege. Not only should you recall the recent Quine material, but also the Frege notes from early on this semester. Pay special attention to Frege on indirect speech.

## I.

- Distinguish vulgar and accidental occurrences of expressions:

vulgar: "denotes, is open to substitution and existential generalization, and contributes to the meaning of the sentence which contains it."

accidental (orthographic accidents): all of the above are inappropriate.

But, there are also *intermediate occurrences*, such as: quotation, modal contexts, and propositional attitude reports. We could try to assimilate these

intermediate cases to either the accidental or the vulgar. Quine is representative of the former route. Frege is representative of the latter.

I shall put forward this analysis — the assimilation of intermediate occurrence to accidental ones — primarily in order to contrast its defeatist character with the sanguine view of Frege (and his followers) that we can assimilate the intermediate occurrences to vulgar ones.

II.

- Be sure to understand what is meant by “opaque context”.

III.

- Here Kaplan turns to the Fregean view:

Frege’s main idea, as I understand it, was just this. There are no *real* intermediate occurrences; the appearance of intermediacy created by apparent failures of substitutivity and the like is due to confusion about what is denoted by the given occurrence. Frege here calls our attention to an implicit assumption made in testing for substitutivity and the like. Namely, that a denoting expression must *always* have its usual denotation, and a fortiori, that two expressions must have the same denotation in a given context if they usually (i.e. in most contexts) have the same denotation.

- The last two paragraphs of this section are an excellent summary of the differences between the Quinian and Fregean approaches.

IV.

- “The difficulties in Frege’s treatment appear in attempting to work out the details — details of the sort: exactly what *does* “nine” denote in (3)–(5)?”

- Note Kaplan’s symbolization for Frege’s understanding of quotation marks, as well as Kaplan’s introduction of meaning marks.

V.–VI.

- The material is dense here, and we will just run through it thoroughly in class. Do note, in particular: the **N/NEC** and **B/BEL** distinctions; the introduction of the denotation predicate; compare (18) and (25); and understand what’s going on with (32)–(34).

VII.–End.

- We’ll skip these sections.