

- Kripke returns to the Cluster Theory of names, reviewed on p. 71.
  - Against Thesis 6: Even if we assume that the referent of a name like ‘Hitler’ is fixed by a description, it still does not follow that Hitler *must* have *any* of the features given by that description. Compare: It is not necessary that stick S is a meter long, even though the reference of ‘one meter’ is fixed by the length of S. (75)

Counterpart theorists are guilty of similar sins. They hold that an individual’s counterparts are determined by relations of similarity. Similarity judgments are based on nearness of fit of the qualitative properties of *possibilia* to the cluster of descriptions used to fix the referent of the actual individual. (76)

- Thesis 1 is a definition, so it cannot be denied.
- Against Thesis 2: Average speakers refer to Feynman when they use the name ‘Feynman’, even though they only know that he is a famous physicist. Their description does not pick him out over, say, Gell-Mann, but they still refer to him with that name. (81)
- Against Thesis 3: Assume that the only description one has for the proper name ‘Godel’ is that he is the man who first proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. If it turns out that, contrary to popular belief, Schmidt is this man, is Schmidt then the referent of ‘Godel’? Kripke says no: The man who is commonly thought to meet this description is Godel. (83–84) (Kripke also gives Peano/Dedekind, Einstein, and Columbus examples on p. 85.)

[It will not help to change the description to: The man who most people think proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. This too is open to counterexamples, plus it is circular. See pages 88–89.]

- Against Thesis 4: The objection to Thesis 2 shows that a name can refer

even though the description associated with it does not pick out a unique individual. Also, the name can refer if *no one* meets the description. E.g., ‘Godel’ would still refer to the same man, even if no one proved the incompleteness of arithmetic (say, the alleged “proof” has been wrong all this time). (86)

○ Against Thesis 5: Kripke knows that Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic, but he doesn’t know this *a priori*! (87)

● Kripke offers his positive theory (or “picture”) of reference on pages 91–97.

○ There is an initial “baptism” in which a name is introduced (by ostension, or with a reference-fixing description), and then an historical chain from those initial baptizers and language users to us (91). In order to refer to the correct person in using that name, we needn’t know about this chain or from whom we derived the name. The actual chain is important – not what the speaker believes regarding the chain. (See the “Cicero” example, p. 92.)

○ Kripke is not offering necessary and sufficient conditions for reference. Instead, he is painting a general picture according to which:

... it’s in virtue of our connection with other speakers in the community, going back to the referent himself, that we refer to a certain man. (94)

Reference is generally not determined by private stipulations and personal decisions.

● Kripke concludes this lecture by returning to the topic of identity statements, and the dark doctrine of contingent identity. (97–105)

○ Descriptions can be used to establish contingent identity statements. E.g., The inventor of bifocals = the first Postmaster General of the U.S.

○ But what about identity statements between names (e.g., Hesperus = Phosphorus) or regarding scientific reductions (e.g., water = H<sub>2</sub>O)? These too are (were) often thought to be contingent, because they had to be discovered *a posteriori*. Kripke disagrees, and argues that these are necessary, though *a posteriori*. In Lecture III, however, he will argue that the alleged mind-body reduction does not fit this pattern.

○ Kripke asks us to consider how it might be that, say, Hesperus could be non-identical to Phosphorus. Maybe we name two different stars/planets ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus.’ But this is not the same as our Hesperus

and Phosphorus being non-identical. (102) Of course from our epistemic position, at one time it could have turned out, for all we *knew*, that Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct. But this was never a metaphysical possibility. Similarly, one might be in a position of ignorance with respect to a necessary mathematical truth. From that position, for all that person knows, it is possible that the alleged truth is false (though, in fact, it is necessarily true). This is a distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibility. (See p. 103.)