

- By ‘name’ Kripke means a proper name. Definite descriptions will not be counted as names. *Designator* is the broader category under which names and descriptions fall. (24)

- Distinguish (25):

semantic referent: the object satisfying a description or named by a name

speaker referent: the object a speaker intends to refer to in using a description or name

- Example: “The man over there with the champagne in his glass is happy.”

- By ‘referent’, Kripke means the semantic referent.

- Q: What is the relation between names and descriptions?

- J.S. Mill: names have denotation, but no connotation (26)

- Frege-Russell went against Mill’s view. They held that proper names are shorthand for definite descriptions.

- Definite descriptions have the advantage of providing us with a method for determining the referent of a name – it is whatever satisfies the description! (28)

- This view better explains *a posteriori* identity claims.

- This view also explains what is being asked by existential questions like: “Did Aristotle exist?” This is asking if there was a person who did such-and-such deeds (i.e., met the definite description corresponding to ‘Aristotle’). (29)

- The Cluster-Concept Theory: The referent of a proper name is determined by a cluster or family of descriptions. The referent is whatever satisfies enough of these descriptions. (31)

⊙Wittgenstein, Searle, & Strawson

- The descriptions of Frege-Russell or Wittgenstein-Searle-Strawson can be seen as occupying one of two roles (32):

1) The descriptions *give the meanings* of the proper names.

Let's say that 'Aristotle' is shorthand for the definite description 'the last great philosopher of antiquity.' If such descriptions give the meaning of proper names, then it is *necessarily* true that Aristotle was the last great philosopher of antiquity.

2) The descriptions *fix the reference* of the proper names.

This view is compatible with it being contingent that Aristotle was the last great philosopher of antiquity, even if 'the last great philosopher of antiquity' is the description that fixes the reference of 'Aristotle.'

- The following types of truths have traditionally been thought to be co-extensive:

i) the *a priori*, analytic, necessary, and certain

ii) the *a posteriori*, synthetic, contingent, and uncertain

There have been limited exceptions in the history of philosophy (e.g., Kant argued for some synthetic, *a priori* truths). But these connections can be systematically broken. Consider *a prioricity* and necessity – the former is an epistemological notion, the latter metaphysical. (Recall the explanation of this separation with regard to the example of Goldbach's Conjecture, pp. 36–37).

○Why have people thought that '*a prioricity*' and 'necessity' are synonyms, or at least co-extensive?

1) If something is necessarily true, then it seems that we should know it is necessarily true just by running through all the possible worlds in our head.

2) Conversely, if something can be known without checking with the world, it seems that it must be true regardless of which world we are in. (38)

○Kripke: Let's stipulate that an analytic statement is true in virtue of the meanings of the words alone. Analytic truths are both *a priori* and necessary. (p. 39)

- At the very bottom of p. 39 Kripke begins talking about *de re* and *de dicto* modality. Kripke begins by presenting Quine's familiar example concerning whether 9 is necessarily odd. He then provides a similar example concerning Nixon. Was it *necessary* that Nixon won the election? Just as the Quinean will claim that the number 9 has essential/accidental properties only relative to a description, the same will be said of Nixon. Relative to the description 'the man who won the 1968 U.S. Presidential election' Nixon essentially won the presidency. (40) According to this view, modal claims about objects must be mediated by a description. But Kripke attacks this Quinean position. In fact, on p. 41 Kripke gives a short intuition-test in defense of *de re* modality. Someone points to Nixon and says: "That's the guy who might have lost." Common sense, Kripke tells us, says this is true. "The guy", the object independent of any description, only contingently won the election. [Q: But, does the term 'the guy' already smuggle in something of a description?]

- Some more terminology:

transworld identity: the identity of objects across possible worlds

Essentialism is connected with "identity across possible worlds." (42) The truth of such trans-world identity claims, one might think, requires a criterion of identity.

criterion of identity: a test for determining, across time and possible worlds, if object  $x$  is identical to object  $y$ .

- If you have a criterion of identity, then you can tell if an object in a possible world is identical to Nixon. You then pick out all the possible Nixons, and see what properties they have in common. This will give you Nixon's essence.

- But Kripke criticizes this approach. First, we have been incapable of coming up with criteria of identity for objects. But, more importantly, Kripke rejects the very procedure of inspecting possible worlds, looking for Nixon. He writes:

What seems to be more objectionable is that this depends on the wrong way of looking at what a possible world is. One thinks, in this picture, of a possible world as if it were like a foreign country. One looks upon it as an observer. Maybe Nixon has moved to the other country and maybe he hasn't, but one is given only qualities. One can observe all his qualities, but, of course, one doesn't observe that someone is Nixon. One observes that something has red hair (or green or yellow) but not whether

something is Nixon. So we had better have a way of telling in terms of properties when we run into the same thing as we saw before; we had better have a way of telling, when we come across one of these other possible worlds, who was Nixon. (43)

Instead of being discovered, possible worlds are *stipulated*. (44) You do not consider a possible world and check to see if the guy with the yellow hair is Nixon. Instead, you stipulate that Nixon is that guy with the yellow hair. Recall the example, from the Preface, of the pair of dice.

- The contrast with Kripke is to take worlds as having only a purely qualitative description. This is roughly the view of David Lewis, briefly discussed (and criticized) in footnote 13, p. 45. On Lewis's view there are individuals in other possible worlds that qualitatively resemble you enough to count as your counterparts. What is possible and necessary for you depends on what is true of your counterparts. (It is not just people that have counterparts – any object, like a rock or chair, has counterparts in other possible worlds.) If all of Nixon's counterparts are human beings, then Nixon is essentially human. If Nixon has a counterpart who loses the election of 1968, then Nixon (*our* Nixon, the actual Nixon) only contingently won the election of 1968. These counterparts are not identical to Nixon – they are other people. Still, they are enough like Nixon to count as his counterparts and ground modal truths about him.

- Kripke's "Humphrey Objection": It is absurd to think that (the actual) Humphrey might have won the election because *someone else* who resembles Humphrey quite a bit in another possible world won the election of 1968. More generally, it is absurd to think that the modal truths about *x* are grounded in what happens to counterparts of *x* in other possible worlds. (See footnote 13.)

- Distinguish these two ways of characterizing possible worlds:

- 1) Possible worlds are fully given by a complete qualitative description
- 2) Possible worlds are given by a complete qualitative description plus stipulations (e.g., Nixon is the guy who won).

Kripke obviously endorses the second way. On p. 46 Kripke raises skeptical worries about there being purely qualitative criteria of identity for Nixon.

- The terms 'rigid designator' and 'non-rigid designator' are introduced on p. 48. Recall this from our discussion of the Preface.

- By rejecting purely qualitative criteria of identity, is Kripke committed to “bare particulars”, or a substrata, to individuate objects? Kripke says no:

It is often said that, if a counterfactual situation is described as one which would have happened to *Nixon*, and if it is not assumed that such a description is reducible to a purely qualitative one, then mysterious ‘bare particulars’ are assumed, propertyless substrata underlying the qualities. This is not so: I think that Nixon is a Republican, not merely that he lies in back of Republicanism, whatever that means; I also think he might have been a Democrat. The same holds for any other properties Nixon may possess, except that some of these properties may be essential. What I do deny is that a particular is nothing but a ‘bundle of qualities’, whatever that may mean. If a quality is an abstract object, a bundle of qualities is an object of even higher degree of abstraction, not a particular. Philosophers have come to the opposite view through a false dilemma: they have asked, are these objects *behind* the bundle of qualities, or is the object *nothing but* the bundle? Neither is the case; this table is wooden, brown, in the room, etc. It has all these properties and is not a thing without properties, behind them; but it should not therefore be identified with the set, or ‘bundle’, of its properties, nor with the subset of its essential properties. (52)

- Also note Kripke’s distinction between perceiving objects and perceiving qualities. (50–53)

- Back to the distinction between fixing the reference and providing the meaning . . . Kripke gives the following as an example of fixing the reference: ‘stick S is one meter long.’ This is a stipulation. It amounts to saying, “However long stick S is (now), let that be one meter.”

◦ Of course, one could change the length of this stick – e.g., by heating it. So, it does not seem necessary that stick S is one meter long. Nor does “one meter” *mean* “the length of S” – the former is a rigid designator, and the latter is not. (55) “The length of S” is not synonymous with “one meter”, but is used to fix the reference of “one meter.”

◦ But how do we know that stick S is one meter long? It seems that we know this *a priori*. We do not have to check with the world to determine its truth – we stipulate it. So, this is a contingent, *a priori* truth. This is another example Kripke provides to break the clusters of concepts given earlier. Also note how this is not an example of definition providing a synonym, but by fixing the reference. (57)

[You might think that we do not really learn a fact when we “know” that “Stick S is one meter long.” See footnote 26, p. 63 for this objection.]

○ Note how descriptions, or clusters of descriptions, could similarly be used in two roles with regard to proper names: providing the meaning of proper names or fixing the reference of proper names. Frege-Russell held that descriptions provide the meanings of ordinary names like ‘Moses.’ If these descriptions only fix the reference of such names, then we need some explanation for singular existential statements and identity statements between names. (59) (Recall that these were two reasons for opting for the Frege-Russell view that names like ‘Moses’ are shorthand for descriptions.) Kripke denies that descriptions play *either* role for proper names.

Also note Kripke’s comments on Frege on the last paragraph of p. 59 (and the footnote) – some of this should be familiar to you.

● Dhat: this is “an operator which transforms each description into a term which rigidly designates the object *actually* satisfying the description.” (footnote 22, p. 60)

● Kripke begins reconsidering the cluster theory on p. 61. Note the 6 theses Kripke attributes to this theory (predominately as a theory of *reference*) on pages 64–65.

○ Kripke notes that those who advocate the cluster theory often focus on the wrong kinds of properties. Recall the story of Jonah as discussed on p. 67.

○ Kripke also adds a Circularity condition, p. 68. On pp. 68–70 Kneale is admonished for violating this condition.