I. The following are inappropriate translations:

“Ernest is hunting lions”:
\[ \exists x (x \text{ is a lion and Ernest is hunting } x) \]

“I want a sloop:
\[ \exists x (x \text{ is a sloop and I want } x) \]

Why? Because Ernest can be hunting lions without there being any particular lions he’s hunting, and I can want a sloop without there being any particular sloop I want. The translations give us the relational sense (of “lion-hunting” and “sloop-wanting”), but the notional sense was probably intended.

◦ To understand this distinction, contrast Quine’s (4) and (6) (or (3) and (5)).

◦ The distinction between the relational and notional senses might be easiest to see in certain belief-reports. Quine, for example, considers two disambiguations of “Ralph believes that someone is a spy”. (356)

◦ Note that the differences between these senses is captured by the scope of the quantifier. But Quine is skeptical of quantifying into propositional attitudes-his example involving Bernard J. Ortcutt is intended to illustrate this.

◦ This is an example of referential opacity. The key symptom for referential opacity is when truth is not preserved by substituting in co-referential terms.

◦ Note the two senses of belief that Quine distinguishes at the end of this section. (These distinctions should sound familiar to you if you know of the de re/de dicto distinction.)
II.
• Perhaps we can get out of this mess (and the multiplying of “belief” relations) by establishing that belief is a relation to an intension (or proposition).

“No intensions named thus by “that”-clauses, without free variables, I shall speak of more specifically as intensions of degree 0, or propositions. In addition I shall (for the moment) recognize intensions of degree 1, or attributes. These are to be named by prefixing a variable to a sentence in which it occurs free; thus \( z(z \text{ is a spy}) \) is spyhood.” (357)

◦ Using these intensions we can admit two-place (believer and proposition) and three-place (believer, object, and attribute) relations.

◦ Using this suggestion to the problem at hand (the Orcutt example), examine (14)–(23) and the “near-contraries” that it engenders. (To see Quine’s reaction to all of this, study the second to last paragraph of this section.)

Q: Is it really acceptable that (15) and (22) both come out as true?

III.
• This same procedure can be extended to other propositional attitudes, as well as to cases of quantification of the subject of the propositional attitude (e.g., “someone hunts lions”).

IV.
• In the first two paragraphs, Quine expresses his well-known skepticism concerning intensional entities.

“The intensions are at best a pretty obscure lot.” (359)

• “But there is a way of dodging the intensions which merits serious consideration. Instead of speaking of intensions we can speak of sentences, naming these by quotation.” (359)

◦ This is to replace “believes that” talk with “believes-true” talk (relative to a language, of course). Although, Quine does conclude with some skeptical remarks about individuating languages.