

PHIL 3923H: Honors Colloquium on Free Will
Prof. Funkhouser
12/5/06
Fischer and Ravizza, Chapter 9

I.

[This section reviews the argument of the entire book. It is redundant, but you might find it helpful to read in your preparations for the final exam.]

II.

- F&R point to 3 main features of their account of moral responsibility:
 1. *Externalism*. Whether or not an agent is morally responsible is determined, in part, by factors beyond the “snapshot” properties of the individual. It also depends on her historical properties and her reasons-responsive connections to the world.
 2. *Compatibilism*. Their account of moral responsibility is independent of the question of determinism.
 3. *Comprehensiveness*. They account for all forms of moral responsibility — actions, consequences, and omissions — in terms of guidance control.

III.

- In this last section they briefly consider how their account of moral responsibility in terms of guidance control could be extended to emotional reactions. The tracing clause of their theory will be prominent here:

What is natural to require, on our sort of approach, is that we can *trace* back to *some* appropriate point in the agent’s past and find an exercise of guidance control that then results in the subsequent emotional reaction. The subsequent emotional reaction must be the result of guidance control at *some* suitable prior time, in order for the agent to be morally responsible for the emotional reaction. (255)

And then:

...all that is required is that the state result from a previous omission of which you had guidance control (and that the previous exercise of guidance control be suitably related to the subsequent state). It is natural to interpret this relationship as follows

(in accordance with the “tracing” approach): it must be reasonable to expect the agent to know that his prior exercise of guidance control will or might well lead to his subsequent emotional state or reaction. (257)