

- Frankfurt's example of a man overcome with anger:

In *The Importance of What We Care About*, Harry Frankfurt describes a hypothetical incident in which a man, seized by a fit of anger, insults a companion and then, recovering his self-possession, pleads to be excused: "I have no idea what triggered the bizarre spasm of emotion. It came over me out of nowhere and I couldn't help it. I wasn't myself." (145)

- Stephens and Graham will apply Frankfurt's theory to cases of psychopathology.

What he calls "experiences of externality" (hereafter, "externalization" for short) present a conceptual problem that is very similar to the problem of how a subject undergoing delusions of thought insertion or verbal hallucination can maintain that a mental episode is another's thought while acknowledging that it occurs in her own mind. Frankfurt proposes a solution to the conceptual problem of externalization that, in our view, also suggests a solution to the conceptual problem presented by experiences of alienation, partly because it is at least a tacit assumption of an experience of alienation that it is also an experience of externality: an experience of not attributing, in some sense, to oneself. (146)

- But first a non-pathological case: Sacks's disowned thoughts.

Sacks also reports his sense of the "other self," of the alien or foreign character of the episodes, by attributing their occurrence to the operation of nonself agency within himself — "This is Death speaking," "my sickness which is speaking." Of course, Sacks himself does not believe that the proposed Death and Sickness are real agents. He does not suffer from delusions of inserted thought. He experiences his thoughts as somehow not his own, but not as another's thoughts. (148)

- The conceptual problem of externalization: How can such experiences occur within one's psychology, but yet not be one's own?

If a thought occurs in my mind, it would seem to follow, as a matter of logical necessity, that it is mine: my thought, my feeling. It would seem, then, that if I acknowledge the episode's innerness while denying that it is my thought that I must either be deeply confused or deviously insincere. (149)

- The active/passive distinction is central to Frankfurt's account of externality. This distinction is also similar to Hoffman and Frith's distinction between the intended and unintended.
- Distinguish: *subjective* alienation and *agency* alienation. (152) There are also two corresponding senses of self-consciousness.

We are saying that our sense of ourselves in self-consciousness actually is two senses: one of ourselves as subject, the other of ourselves as agent. (155)

- Frankfurt discusses externality, but he doesn't say anything that would explain why thoughts are ever attributed to another. But, Stephens and Graham use Frankfurt's concept of mental agency to explain the delusion of thought insertion.

We propose that experiences of thought insertion involve an analogous impression or belief concerning one's thoughts. The subject has the sense that a thought occurring in her mind has been carried out by or expresses the agency of another person. She attributes the "movement" of her mind to the other, saying that he is the person who has done or *thinks* it. She acknowledges her own involvement in this episode, but she sees herself not as the agent but only as the patient or subject in whom the thought occurs. (154)