

- Thought insertion is like hearing voices in that it is an episode of alienated inner speech, but it is unlike hearing voices in that it is not mistaken for an auditory experience. Stephens and Graham aim to provide a unified account of the alien quality of both thought insertion and voices.

- With thought insertion, the subject still recognizes the thought as occurring within her ego boundary. But she thinks that, nevertheless, in some sense it is not her thought.

- The Lockean tradition holds that introspection always involves the self-attribution of thoughts, but the Humean tradition denies this. (123–124)

- If the supposedly inserted thoughts were taken to be outside one's ego boundary, then the subject would claim introspective awareness of another's mental states. But, schizophrenic subjects do not make this mistake.

In the examples of thought insertion discussed in the clinical literature, patients are well aware of the subjectivity of their thoughts: of where they occur. They regard them as occurring within their ego boundaries. (126)

- Thought they recognize their ego boundaries, these subjects still make very puzzling claims about these thoughts.

Nevertheless, and here is the conceptual oddity of thought insertion, subjects deny that they think the relevant thoughts. They insist that the thought is not theirs but another's, despite their recognition of its subjectivity. Thus, the question that is relevant for thought insertion is this: What remains to be explained about my awareness that a thought is my own, once we explain how I recognize that the thought occurs in me? (127)

- Stephens and Graham are skeptical of the claim that ego-boundary confusion can arise even in cases of dissociative identity disorder.

- Frith holds that alienation (e.g., of thoughts or voices) is due to a self-monitoring failure. There is evidence that schizophrenics have difficulties determining their own agency. He applies this deficiency to voices in particular:

Frith believes that auditory hallucinations can be attributed to monitoring failures. Confronted with an experience of speech, the subject cannot tell whether he generated the speech he experiences, either vocally or subvocally, or whether he is perceiving speech generated by someone else. Thus, he may interpret his experience of his own inner or subvocal speech as the auditory perception of another's speech. (137)

He makes a similar claim about thoughts.

- Like Hoffman, Frith emphasizes the role that categorizing thoughts as willed or stimulus-driven plays in determining whether a thought or voice is our own. But, Hoffman and Frith do differ.

Hoffman argues that defective discourse planning produces unintended thoughts which the subject recognizes as such. Frith suggests that the relevant thoughts are intended but that a failure of monitoring prevents the subject from recognizing them as intended. (141)

- But, Frith's account does not explain why the thoughts are deemed alien rather than simply unintended or under the control of another.