

- This chapter addresses twisted self-deception — cases in which the self-deceived do not desire that  $p$  (or, perhaps better, desire that not- $p$ ). Mele is open to different accounts for straight and twisted self-deception. One might wonder if a unified account would be preferable.

- The FTL model can be used to explain twisted self-deception:

Recall that the “cost” of an error for an individual, in the FTL model, depends on the individual’s interests and desires. Whereas for many people, perhaps, it may be more important to avoid acquiring the false beliefs that their spouses are having affairs than to avoid acquiring the false belief that they are not so engaged, the converse may well be true of some insecure, jealous people. The belief that one’s spouse is unfaithful tends to cause significant psychological discomfort. Even so, avoiding falsely believing that their spouses are faithful may be so important to some people that they test the relevant hypothesis in ways that are less likely to lead to a false belief in their spouses’ fidelity than to a false belief in their spouses’ infidelity. (96–97)

- Perhaps emotion, rather than desire, can provide the motivation for self-deception. E.g., the man might be motivated toward twisted self-deception concerning his wife’s fidelity out of jealousy or fear rather than a desire for (or against) her fidelity.

- Q: But why wouldn’t the jealousy or fear bias toward believing that she has been faithful? (100)

- Mele notes that the empirical literature on the influence emotion has on cognition is not adequate to answer such questions.

- Mele also notes that we can have some control over our emotional and motivational states, as well as their influence on our belief formation. (102–103)

- On pp. 104–110, Mele argues that self-deception requires partiality. The self-deceived believe something that an impartial audience, with access to the same evidence, would not believe.
- Mele also proposes a hybrid desire/emotion account of twisted self-deception. He notes that both desires and emotions can contribute to the costs of particular false beliefs. Further, most emotions are partially constituted by desires, making it difficult to determine if an emotion, as distinct from desire, is responsible for a biased belief.