

- One can be self-deceived in either *acquiring* or *retaining* a belief. On pp. 50–51 Mele offers sufficient conditions for self-deception in acquiring a belief.
 - Objection: These conditions are not sufficient for self-deception because they do not capture its characteristic tension. (52)
 - Q: Is there a problem with pre-supposing that the self-deceived actually come to believe what they are motivated to believe? Is Mele overlooking other considerations that could plausibly generate static puzzles about self-deception?
 - Nor are feelings of anxiety essential to self-deception, contrary to Barnes's account.
- Mele denies that the self-deceived must recognize that their evidence supports the contrary belief. Such recognition is not necessary to account for the biased reasoning.
 - Mele applies the FTL model to self-deception in retaining a belief — Sam, Sally, and Mr. Jones.
 - Against the supposed dynamic problems for self-deception, Mele reminds us that the strategies used in self-deception need not be implemented with an intention to deceive. Further, recourse to intentions is not needed to explain why motivation to believe that p sometimes leads to biased reasoning and other times does not. The FTL model can account for this by itself. Here, see the story about Gordon the CIA agent (63–64).
 - An extreme case: Gimpel the Fool. Mele denies that an intention to deceive is necessary to explain such extreme insensitivity to the evidence. Nor is there any reason to think that Gimpel ever has both the belief that p and the belief that not- p at the same time.