

- Chapter 4 is concerned with attempted empirical demonstrations, by psychologists, of self-deceived agents who believe both p and not- p (so-called “dual belief”). You might wonder whether this is the kind of thing that can be empirically demonstrated. Of course if you think that, for conceptual reasons, no agent can believe both some proposition and its negation, then you will obviously hold that this cannot be empirically demonstrated. But Mele concedes that this is possible. He just does not think it is true, or at least it need not be true, of self-deceivers.

- Who is a better authority, the philosopher or the psychologist, when it comes to interpreting the mental states of these study subjects? Who is the expert in attributing beliefs — the one who studies rationality?

- Alternatives to the dual belief interpretation could use belief-relevant verbs like *suspects* or *doubts* to more accurately characterize one of the supposed beliefs. E.g., self-deceivers believe that not- p , but suspect that p .

- The main experiments that Mele discusses are Gur and Sackeim’s voice recognition study, and Quattrone and Tversky’s cold water study.

- In the G&S study subjects avow one belief, though providing physiological symptoms indicative of an opposing belief. While this result is interesting, in regards to the voice recognition example, examples of the same form are common in many other domains. There are many examples in which people’s avowals and non-linguistic behavior part ways, and we are left deciding which to privilege. The G&S position is that we should take each seriously and attribute the contradictory beliefs. But Mele (correctly it seems) points out that the physiological evidence is by no means sufficient for attributing a belief. (Mele could have said the same about the avowal, couldn’t he?)

- In the cold water study Q&T attribute dual beliefs with the following contents: a) I did not try to shift my tolerance, and b) I did try to shift my tolerance. Again, Mele argues against the necessity and legitimacy of

attributing these beliefs. And he further argues that there is no reason to suppose that the agents tried to shift their tolerance. Here, recall Mele's anti-agency stance once again.