ECON 6913 Experimental Economics
Spring 2017

Office Hours: Tuesday 11:00-12:00 and by appointment.
(but I am around most of the time so feel free to drop by my office!)

 

Contact Information
Office Location: 425 WCOB
Phone: 575-6226
email:
cdeck@walton.uark.edu

 

Download a copy of the course syllabus

 

Schedule

Date

Topic

Room

Material / Notices

1/17

Contests

Lab

Class Data

1/19

Contests

Classroom

Readings 1

1/24

Methodology

Classroom

Readings 2

1/26

Methodology

Classroom

Readings 3

1/31

Double Auction

216 JBHT

 

2/2

Double Auction

Classroom

Readings 4

2/7

Information Markets & Hyperinflation

Classroom

Readings 5

2/9

Asset Markets

Lab

Class Data

2/14

Asset Markets

Classroom

Readings 6

2/16

Posted Offer

Lab

 

2/21

Posted Offer

Classroom

Readings 7

2/23

Posted Offer

Classroom

Readings 8

2/28

ztree

Lab

 

3/2

ztree

Lab

 

3/7

Auctions

Classroom

Readings 9

3/9

Auctions

Classroom

Readings 10

3/14

Risk

Classroom

Readings 11 - Student Presentations

3/16

Risk

Classroom

Readings 12

3/21 

Spring Break

??

A great time to work on your research!

3/23 

Spring Break

??

A great time to work on your research!

3/28

Public Goods

Classroom

Readings 13 – Referee Report 1 Due

3/30

Public Goods

Classroom

Readings 14 - Student Presentations

4/4

Games

Lab

 

4/6

Games

Classroom

Readings 15 - Student Presentations

4/11

Games

Classroom

Readings 16

4/13

No Class

4/18

Games & Replication

Classroom

Class starts at 8:30
Readings 17 & Readings 18
Aaron to present
Fehr and Schmidt (1999)

4/20 

Cognitive Load

Lab

 

4/25

Cognitive Load

Classroom

Readings 19 – Referee Report 2 Due

4/27

Student Topic 1

Classroom

 

5/2

Student Topic 2

Classroom

 

5/4

Student Topic 3

Classroom

 



Announcements

The class website may not have current information and is not binding. It is the student's responsibility to keep up with the class schedule, current assignments and announcements as they are made in class.


Economic Science Association Website

 

Reading List

1a. Sheremeta, R. (2011). “Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation.” Economic Inquiry 49, pp. 573–90.

 

1b. Deck, C., S. Sarangi, and M. Wiser (2016). "An Experimental Investigation of Simultaneous Multi-battle Contests with Strategic Complementarities." Journal of Economic Psychology, forthcoming.

 

2a. Smith V., (1982). “Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science.” The American Economic Review 72(5), pp. 923-955

 

2b. Smith, Vernon. (1989). “Theory, Experiment and Economics.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3(1), pp. 151-69.

 

2c. Smith, Vernon. (1994). “Economics in the Laboratory.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(1), pp. 113-31.

 

3a. Friedman and Sunder, (1994). Experimental Methods, a Primer for EconomistsCh 2-4.

 

3b. Zizzo, Daniel. (2010). "Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments" Experimental Economics 13, pp. 75-98.

 

3c. Falk, A. and Heckman, J. (2009) “Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge in the Social Sciences” Science 326, pp. 535-538.

 

3d. Charness, G., Gneezy, Eu. And Kuhn, M. (2013).  “Experimental Methods:  Extra-Laboratory Experiments-Extending the Reach of Experimental Economics.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 91, pp. 93-100.

 

4a. Smith, V. (1962). An Experiential Study of Competitive Market Behavior. Journal of Political Economy, 70(2), pp. 111-137.

 

4b. van Boening, M. and Wilcox, N. (1996) Avoidable Cost: Ride a Double Auction Roller Coaster. American Economic Review 86(3), pp. 461-477.

 

5a. Plott, C. and S. Sunder (1988) “Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information in Security Markets.” Econometrica 56(5), 1085-1118.

 

5b. Deck, C., K. McCabe, and D. Porter (2006) "Why Stable Fiat Money Hyperinflates: Evidence from an Experimental Economy" Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 61(3), 471-86.

 

6a. Reshamann, N. D. Porter, and V. Smith. (2008). Thar She Blows: Can Bubbles Be Rekindled with Experienced Subjects? American Economic Review 98(3), pp. 924-937.

 

6b. Kirchler, M., J. Huber, T. Stockl (2010). Thar She Bursts – Reducing Confusion Reduces Bubbles, American Economic Review 102(2), pp 865-883.

 

6c. Cheung, S., M. Hedegaard, and S. Palan (2014). “To See is to Believe:  Common Expectations in Experimental Asset Markets.” European Economic Review 66, pp. 84-96.   

 

7a. Ketcham, J., V. Smith, and A.Williams. (1984). A Comparison of Posted-Offer and Double-Auction Pricing Institutions, The Review of Economic Studies 51(4), pp. 595-614.

 

7b. Davis, D. and O. Korenok. (2009). Posted Offer Markets in Near-Continuous Time: an Experimental Investigation. Economic Inquiry 47(3), pp. 449-466.

 

8a. Deck, C. and B. Wilson. (2008). Experimental Gasoline Markets. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 67(1), July 2008, pp. 134-149.

 

8b Deck, C. and B. Wilson. (2006). “Tracking Customer Search to Price Discriminate" Economic Inquiry, 44(2), pp. 280-95.

 

9a. Cox, J., B. Roberson, and V.L. Smith. (1982). "Theory and Behavior of Single Object Auctions," in Vernon L. Smith (ed.), Research in Experimental Economics, Greenwich: JAI Press.

 

9b. Lucking-Reiley, D. (1999). "Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet," American Economic Review, 89, pp. 1062-1080.

 

10a. Gneezy, U. and R. Smorodinsky (2006). “All-pay Auctions – an Experimental Study” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 61, 255-275.

 

10b. McCabe, K., S. Rassenti, V. Smith. (1992). Designing Call Auction Institutions: Is the Double Dutch Best? The Economic Journal 102, pp. 9-23.

 

10c. Cox, J. and S. Hayne. (2006). "Barking up the Right Tree: Are Small Groups Rational Agents?" Experimental Economics 9(3), pp. 209-222.  

 

11a. Holt, C., and Laury, S2002. “Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects.” American Economic Review, December, 1644 -1655.

 

11b. Eckel, C.C., Grossman, P.J., (2002). “Sex Differences and Statistical Stereotyping in Attitudes Toward Financial Risk.” Evolution and Human Behavior 23 (4), 281–295

 

11c. Isaac, R. M., and James, D. 2000. “Just Who Are You Calling Risk Averse.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 20(2), 177-87.

 

12a. Tversky, K. D. Kahneman. (1992) Advances in Prospect Theory:  Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5, 297-323.

 

12b. Cox, James, V. Sadiraj, and U. Schmidt. (2015). "Paradoxes and Mechanisms for Choice under Risk", Experimental Economics, 18(2), 215-250.

 

13a. Isaac, R. Mark and Walker, James M. (1988). “Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 103(1), pp. 179-199.

 

13b. Andreoni, J. (1995). "Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?" The American Economic Review 85(4), pp. 891-904.

 

13c. Houser, D. and Kurzban, R. (2002). Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Goods Experiments, The American Economic Review 92(4), pp. 1062-1069.

 

14a. Fehr, E. and Gächter, S. (2000). “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments” The American Economic Review 90(4), pp. 980-994.

 

14b. List, John and Lucking-Reiley David. (2002). The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign. Journal of Political Economy 110, pp.215-233.

 

14c. Eckel, Catherine C. and Grossman, Philip J. (2005) Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: a natural field experiment comparing matching and rebate subsidies, Experimental Economics 11(3), pp. 234-252.

 

15a. Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin A. McCabe, Keith Shachat, and Vernon L. Smith, “Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, VII (1994), 346-80.

 

15b. Andreoni, J., and Vesterlund, L. (1999). “Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), pp. 293-312.

 

15c. Engel, C. (2011), “Dictator games: a meta study” Experimental Economics 14(4), 583-610.

 

16a. Cox, J., and Deck, C. (2005) "On the Nature of Reciprocal Motives" Economic Inquiry 43(3), pp. 623-35.

 

16b. Wilson, B., J. Osborn, and B. Sherwood. (2015). “Conduct in Narrativized Trust Games, Southern Economic Journal, 81(3), 562-597.

 

17a. Fehr, E., K. Schmidt. (1999). "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation". The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (3): 817–868.

 

17b. McKelvey, R. and T. Palfrey. (1998) “Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games” Experimental Economics 1, 9-41. 

 

17c. Camerer, C., T. Ho, and J-K. Chong. (2004). A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(3). 861-898.

 

18a. Ioannidis, J. (2005). “Why Most Published Research Findings are False.” PLOS|Medicine 2(8), e124.

 

18b. Maniads, Z. F. Tufano, and J. List. (2016). “How to Make Experimental Economics Research More Reproducible: Lessons from Other Disciplines and a New Proposal” in Research in Experimental Economics, vol 18 Eds. C. Deck, E. Fatas, and T. Rosenblat

 

19a. Deck, C. and S. Jahedi (2015). “The Effect of Cognitive Load on Economic Decision Making: A Survey and New Experiments." European Economic Review 78, pp. 97-119. 

 

19b. Deck, C., S. Jahedi, and R. Sheremeta (2017). “Comparing Techniques for Inducing Cognitive Load.”  Working Paper, University of Arkansas.