ECON 636 Experimental Economics
Fall 2009

Office Hours: Tuesday and Thursday 12:30-2:00 and by appointment.
(but I am around most of the time so feel free to drop by my office!)

Contact Information
                        Office Location: 425 WCOB
                        Phone: 575-6226
                        email: cdeck@walton.uark.edu

Download a copy of the course syllabus

Reading List / Schedule

Date	Topic	Room	Material / Notices
8/25	Selfish Behavior	lab
8/27	Ultimatums and Trust	classroom	Readings 1
9/1	Ultimatums and Trust	classroom	Readings 2
9/3	Methodology	classroom	Readings 3
9/8	Methodology	classroom	Readings 4
9/10	Coordination Games	lab
9/15	Coordination Games	classroom	Readings 5
9/17	Public Goods	classroom
9/22	Public Goods	classroom	Readings 6
9/24	Public Goods	classroom	Readings 7
9/29	VB programming	classroom
10/1	VB programming	classroom
10/6	Double Auction	classroom
10/8	Double Auction	classroom	Readings 9
10/13	Double Auction Applications	lab
10/15	Double Auction Applications	classroom	Readings 10
10/20	Double Auction Applications	classroom	Readings 11
10/22	Corruption	lab
10/27	Corruption	classroom	Reading 8
10/29	Posted Offer	classroom
11/3	Posted Offer	classroom	Readings 12
11/5	Posted Offer Applications	lab
11/10	Posted Offer Applications	classroom	Readings 13
11/12	Auctions	lab	Using data from the first 20 periods, estimate Bid = a+bvalue+csecond+dsecondvalue where second is a dummy variable for the second price auction in periods 11-20. Test if a=0, a+c=0, b=5/6, b+d=1. Also, test to see if the average price was different between each type of auction (first second, English, Dutch).
11/17	Auctions	classroom	Readings 14
11/19	Auctions	classroom	Readings 15
11/24	Project Workday	office
11/26	Thanksgiving	couch
12/1	Presentations	classroom
12/3	Presentations	classroom
12/8	Pilot	lab	We can meet early on the 8th or on the 10th as needed.

Announcements

Economic Science Association Website

Readings

1.a Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin A. McCabe, Keith Shachat, and Vernon L. Smith, “Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, VII(1994), 346-80

1.b Berg, Joyce, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe. (1995) "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History" Games and Economic Behavior, (10), pp. 122-142.

1.c Cox, J., and Deck, C. (2005) "On the Nature of Reciprocal Motives" Economic Inquiry 43(3), pp. 623-35.

2.a Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sloof, Randolph and van de Kuilen, Gijs. “Cultural differences in ultimatum game experiments: evidence from a meta-analysis.” Experimental Economics, June 2004, 7(2), pp. 171-188.

2.b Zak, P., Kurzban, R. and Matzner, W.T. (2005). Oxytocin is associated with human trustworthiness, Hormones and Behavior 48, 522-527.

2.c Andreoni, J., and Vesterlund, L. (1999). Which Is The Fair Sex? Gender Differences In Altruism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), pp. 293-312.

2.d Wilson, R. and Eckel, C. Judging a Book by Its Cover: Beauty and Expectations in the Trust Game. Political Research Quarterly, 59, pp.189-202.

3.a Smith V., (1982) Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science, The American Economic Review 72(5), pp. 923-955

3.b Smith, Vernon. "Theory, Experiment and Economics." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3(1), 1989, pp. 151-69.

3.c Smith, Vernon. "Economics in the Laboratory." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(1), 1994, pp. 113-31.

4.a Friedman and Sunder, Experimental Methods, a Primer for Economists, Ch 1-3.

5.a Van Huyck, J. B., Battalio, R. C., & Beil, R. O. (1990). Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure. The American Economic Review, 80, 234–248.

5.b Devetag, G. and Ortmann, A. (2007). When and Why? A Critical Survey On Coordination Failure in the Laboratory. Experimental Economics, 10, 331–344.

5.c Deck, C. and Nikiforakis, N. (2009). Information Effects in a Dynamic Minimum-Effort Game. Working Paper, University of Arkansas

6.a Isaac, R. Mark and Walker, (1988). James M. “Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 103(1), pp. 179-199.

6.b Andreoni, J. (1995). "Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?" The American Economic Review 85(4), pp. 891-904.

6.c Houser,D. and Kurzban, R. (2002). Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Goods Experiments, The American Economic Review 92(4), pp. 1062-1069.

7a. List, John and Lucking-Reiley David. (2002). The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign. Journal of Political Economy 110, pp.215-233.

7b. Eckel, Catherine C. and Grossman, Philip J. (2005) Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: a natural field experiment comparing matching and rebate subsidies, Experimental Economics 11(3), pp. 234-252.

8a. Olken, B. (2007). Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. Journal of Political Economy, 115(2), pp. 200-249.

8b. Alatas, Vivi, Cameron^, L., Chaudhuri, C., Erkal, N., Gangadharan^,L. (2009). Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students. Experimental Economics 12(1), pp. 113-132.

9a. Smith, V. (1962). An Experiential Study of Competitive Market Behavior. Journal of Political Economy, 70(2), pp. 111-137.

9b. Williams, A. and Smith, V. (1984). Cyclical Double-Auction Markets with and without Speculators, Journal of Business 57(1), pp. 1-33.

9c. van Boening, M. and Wilcox, N. (1996) Avoidable Cost: Ride a Double Auction Roller Coaster. American Economic Review 86(3), pp. 461-477.

10a. Noussair, C., Plott, C. and Riezman, R. (1995). An Experimental Investigation of the Patterns of International Trade. American Economic Review 85(3), pp. 462-491.

10b. Deck, C., McCabe, K. and Porter, D.(2006). Why Stable Fiat Money Hyperinflates: Results from an Experimental Economy, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 61,p p. 471-486.

11a. King, R., V. Smith, A. Williams, and M. Van Boening. The Robustness of Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Stock Markets. Nonlinear Dynamics and Evolutionary Economics eds. Day and Chen, 1993.

11b. Hanson, R. Oprea, R. and Porter, D. (2006). Information Aggregation and Manipulation in an Experimental Market. Journal of Economic Behavior 60(4), pp. 449-459.

12a. Ketcham, J., V. Smith, and A.Williams. (1984). A Comparison of Posted-Offer and Double-Auction Pricing Institutions, The Review of Economic Studies 51(4), pp. 595-614.

12b. Davis, D. and O. Korenok. (2009). Posted Offer Markets in Near-Continuous Time: an Experimental Investigation. Economic Inquiry 47(3), pp. 449-466.

13a. Deck, C. and B. Wilson. (2008). Experimental Gasoline Markets. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 67(1), July 2008, pp. 134-149.

13b. Rassenti, S. V. Smith, and B. Wilson. (2003). Controlling Market Power and Price Spikes in Electricity Networks: Demand-side bidding. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 1000(5), pp. 2998-3003.

14a. Cox, J., B. Roberson, and V.L. Smith. 1982. "Theory and Behavior of Single Object Auctions," in Vernon L. Smith (ed.), Research in Experimental Economics, Greenwich: JAI Press.

14b. McCabe, K., S. Rassenti, V. Smith. 1992. Designing Call Auction Institutions: Is the Double Dutch Best? The Economic Journal 102, pp. 9-23.

14c. Deck, C. and B. Wilson. 2008. "Fixed Revenue Auctions" Economic Inquiry 46(3), pp. 342-354.

15a. Cox, J. and S. Hayne. 2006. "Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational agents?" Experimental Economics 9(3), pp. 209-222.

15b. Lucking-Reiley, D. 1999. "Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet," American Economic Review, 89, pp. 1062-1080.

15c. Resnick, P., R. Zeckhauser, J. Swanson, K. Lockwood. 2006. "The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment" Experimental Economics 9(2), pp. 79-101.

This website may not have current information and is not binding. It is the student's responsibility to keep up with the class schedule, current assignments and announcements as they are made in class.