PHIL 4403: Philosophy of Art
Prof. Funkhouser
3/30/05
Exam #2 Review

Your second exam is on Monday, April 4th. Please bring a bluebook for the exam. The exam will consist of only “short answer” questions (e.g., 3 to 5 sentences for a satisfactory answer) this time. Questions may differ for undergraduate and graduate students. Any material from the readings, class notes, and lecture is fair game for the exam. However, I have listed some particular topics as a special reminder. This list is not necessarily exhaustive.

Creating Art: Kant on art vs. handicraft, art vs. science, and artistic genius (inspiration), imitation (representation) and the prospects of teaching one to be an artist; Poe’s mechanical procedure for producing “The Raven”

Interpreting Art: Intentionalism, Anti-Intentionalism, and the Intentional Fallacy; internal and external evidence; Beardsley’s case for privileging the internal evidence; comparing artistic interpretation to linguistic interpretation; Beardsley’s examples—e.g., the Housman poem; Wollheim on retrieving the creative process; Wollheim’s criticism of the method of scrutiny; Intentionalists and Anti-Intentionalist’s on whether an artwork can change its meaning over time, as well as the status of perfect forgeries

Evaluating Art: Standard of Taste; the skeptical argument against a standard of taste; Hume’s rules for being a critic (development of delicacy, etc.); Hume’s confidence in an aesthetic consensus (if these rules are followed), and the test of time; Ethicism; Gaut’s case for the moral evaluation of feelings and other states of mind; Ethicism; Gaut’s “merited-response” argument for Ethicism; Wilde’s “New Aesthetics”, and the central theses behind his claim that art is autonomous; Savile’s account of what it is for a work to pass the test of time

Aesthetic Properties: Sibley’s claim that aesthetic qualities depend on non-aesthetic qualities, but no description in non-aesthetic terms is ever sufficient for the application of an aesthetic term; Sibley on taste; supervenience and perfect forgeries; Walton’s distinction among standard, variable, and contra-standard properties, and the relevance of these distinctions to determining aesthetic properties; Walton on how aesthetic properties depend on the category the work is assigned to; Walton’s account of how there is nevertheless objectivity in aesthetic judgments, and the determinants of correct categorization

Paradoxes of Fiction: Radford’s stories supporting the premise that “being moved” requires belief that actual suffering has (likely) occurred; Radford’s objections to various proposed solutions, and his acceptance of incoherence; quasi-fear; Walton’s theory that movie-goers are merely pretending to be afraid, etc.; Lamarque on mental representations as the objects of our fiction-inspired emotions; Lamarque’s “frightened by”/”frightened of” and “fictional, and non-assertive”/”non-fictional, and assertive” distinctions